Subject: Ackanomic Digest V2 #38
From: [email-masked] (Ackanomic Digest)
To: ackanomic-digest

Ackanomic Digest         Monday, April 7 1997         Volume 02 : Number 038

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 06:00:24 +0000
From: "Bascule" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

Malenkai wrote:
> Vynd wrote:
> 
> > Personaly,
> > I think whoever judges this should ignore Narf's reasoning, as he
> > specificaly requests, and declare that the game is not unplayable based on
> > the fact that we are clearly playing it =)
> 
> There has been a bit of history on this sort of stuff, in particular,
> CFJ 113 was called after a player  alledgedly won the game (thus ending
> it, in theory), as was CFJ 157.  In CFJ 187, I wrote a book about this
> thing as a Supreme Court justice.  The general principle so far seems
> to be that there is a grace period after the game "ends" to call these
> sorts of CFJs, as there is a FALSE thread in which it would be legal to
> call it anyway.  In the true thread, it seems we have the classical
> Godelian halting problem, the verdict can never come back (sort of like
> CFJ 228 or 232 or whatever it was).
> 
> I guess I've personally never liked the "because we're playing", the game
> is playable argument.  It seems the counterargument is that we think
> we are playing acka, but are really playing something acka-like, without
> the fatal paradox.
> 
> Malenkai

Ooh I love this. I believe this is the old Platonist/pragmatist
argument again (I'm not sure; I know zip about Plato). I've met this 
sort of argument elsewhere tho, in philosophy of science. Anyway.

Unlike Malenkai, I like the "because we're playing it" argument. I
think this is the best argument, and I believe his "we _think_ we
are playing Acka" stuff has a problem, which is that this is always
the case. How could we tell the difference? Who is to say better than
us? There is no all-seeing all-knowing arbiter out there to tell us.
There are the all-powerful-rules of course; but the last time I
looked, the rules had yet to return even one CFJ; they have no
existence beyond our interpretation of them. Ditto the game state:
what we think it is defines what it is. There is no higher authority 
to appeal to. 

I've been itching for a discussion on this for ages. If nobody 
replies to this post, I'll follow it up and argue with myself :^)

Bascule

 

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 06:01:02 +0000
From: "Bascule" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Acka: Vacation

I hereby return from vacation.

Bascule

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 07 Apr 1997 01:08:49 -0500
From: Malenkai <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

Bascule wrote:

> Ooh I love this. I believe this is the old Platonist/pragmatist
> argument again (I'm not sure; I know zip about Plato). I've met this
> sort of argument elsewhere tho, in philosophy of science. Anyway.
> 
> Unlike Malenkai, I like the "because we're playing it" argument.

It looks like I'm the Platonist and you're the pragmatist :).  Thats
ok I suppose, because I've always thought of myself as a Platonist.

> I think this is the best argument, and I believe his "we _think_ we
> are playing Acka" stuff has a problem, which is that this is always
> the case. How could we tell the difference?

We do things that are againts the rules all the time.  As soon as someone
points out that we are doing so, we will know.  Someone may point out
that further play has been impossible since Janurary 6th, because of a
rule that says so, but happens to not be on the web page, for example.

> Who is to say better than us? There is no all-seeing all-knowing
> arbiter out there to tell us.

Well, the judge, once shown the rule, or paradox, or whatever, *is* the
arbitrator and can tell us we've been crashed for a long time.  This 
happened in the case of old rule 457, where, do due a bug, the rule had no
effect, thus no one was ever on vacation, and although it *didn't* happen,
a lot of proposals could have failed due to quorum, but we were playing
as if none of them actually failed due to quorum.

> There are the all-powerful-rules of course; but the last time I
> looked, the rules had yet to return even one CFJ; they have no
> existence beyond our interpretation of them. Ditto the game state:
> what we think it is defines what it is.

Well, this is more of a faith argument.  The Platonist argument is 
that the rules and the game state exist in the absense of anyone to
interpret them, and unless they give legal weight to a mis-interpretation,
the mis-interpretation does not actually happen.  This is what my
crime amendment did -- if a misinterpretation went unnoticed for a
fortnight, the rules adjusted themselves and the game state retroactively
as if the mis-interpretation was correct.  This could not happen to the
game state without this rule working like this (and it did happen at least
twice, BTW :=)).

Malenkai
Platonist

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 07 Apr 1997 01:21:39 -0500
From: Malenkai <[email-masked]>
Subject: Acka: Potato and Aliens

IdiotBoy has found the magic potato, and is beldin's tailor.
Red Barn has the tuba.

Aliens!  The following numbers were rolled this time:

945
1309 -----> ALIENS KIDNAP RULE 1309 !! <-----

Rule 1131 describes the effects of the abduction.  The rule is 
repealed for 1 week.  It is "good form" to compose an epic tale of
abduction, perhaps some other time, or perhaps someone else wants
to.

Also, this is considered use of a paranormal power by a non-player
entity.  Does that have any effect on the game state?

Malenkai

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 00:35:07 -0500 (CDT)
From: Thierry Joffrain <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: Potato and Aliens 

>1309 -----> ALIENS KIDNAP RULE 1309 !! <-----
>
>Rule 1131 describes the effects of the abduction.  The rule is 
>repealed for 1 week.  It is "good form" to compose an epic tale of
>abduction, perhaps some other time, or perhaps someone else wants
>to.
>
>Also, this is considered use of a paranormal power by a non-player
>entity.  Does that have any effect on the game state?

I'd like to volunteer to help the W-File pair

Calvin N Hobbes

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 6 Apr 1997 21:45:14 -0800 (AKDT)
From: Phil Ackley <[email-masked]>
Subject: Ack: Name Change

I hereby recognize ThinMan's request to hange his name.  Sorry to have
missed this while in gaol.

BTW, The Registrars page will be updated Manana.  I've been taking care of
a friends houe for the last week or so and havn't been home much to update
it.

snowgod

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 06:48:17 +0000
From: "Bascule" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

Malenkai wrote:
> It looks like I'm the Platonist and you're the pragmatist :).  Thats
> ok I suppose, because I've always thought of myself as a Platonist.

I've always thought of myself as a pragmatist :)

> > I think this is the best argument, and I believe his "we _think_ we
> > are playing Acka" stuff has a problem, which is that this is always
> > the case. How could we tell the difference?
> 
> We do things that are againts the rules all the time.  As soon as someone
> points out that we are doing so, we will know.  Someone may point out
> that further play has been impossible since Janurary 6th, because of a
> rule that says so, but happens to not be on the web page, for example.
>
> > Who is to say better than us? There is no all-seeing all-knowing
> > arbiter out there to tell us.
> 
> Well, the judge, once shown the rule, or paradox, or whatever, *is* the
> arbitrator and can tell us we've been crashed for a long time.  This 
> happened in the case of old rule 457, where, do due a bug, the rule had no
> effect, thus no one was ever on vacation, and although it *didn't* happen,
> a lot of proposals could have failed due to quorum, but we were playing
> as if none of them actually failed due to quorum.

I agree entirely with what Malenkai has written, however I think it
is an argument for pragmatism! When the error is pointed out, we all 
have another think, and decide that the game state is something else. 
The game state has changed because we have decided that it ought to 
be something different to that which we previously thought.
 
> > There are the all-powerful-rules of course; but the last time I
> > looked, the rules had yet to return even one CFJ; they have no
> > existence beyond our interpretation of them. Ditto the game state:
> > what we think it is defines what it is.
> 
> Well, this is more of a faith argument.  The Platonist argument is 
> that the rules and the game state exist in the absense of anyone to
> interpret them, and unless they give legal weight to a mis-interpretation,
> the mis-interpretation does not actually happen. 

Yep. Supposing a meteorite hit the (flat of course) world tomorrow
and we all die instantly - will the game continue in our absence?
Without players to interpret the rules, I argue that the game ceases
to exist. 

> This is what my
> crime amendment did -- if a misinterpretation went unnoticed for a
> fortnight, the rules adjusted themselves and the game state retroactively
> as if the mis-interpretation was correct.  This could not happen to the
> game state without this rule working like this (and it did happen at least
> twice, BTW :=)).

I think that in the vast majority of cases, the Platonist and
pragmatist arguments reduce to the same thing. I'm trying to think
of a case where they might lead to a material difference in play -
with Narf's paradox win claim perhaps? 

If Platonists believe that there is the correct game state going on
all the time, with us trying to work out what it is, and pragmatists 
believe that what we currently think is the game state is the game 
state, subject to us being allowed to change our minds in the 
future, then in practice there is little difference between us.

> Malenkai 
> Platonist 

Bascule
Pragmatist
Trying to think of an argument that truly separates the two positions

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 00:57:22 -0500 (CDT)
From: Thierry Joffrain <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord) 

Bascule the pragmatist and Malenkai the Platonist spake thusly:
>> Unlike Malenkai, I like the "because we're playing it" argument.
>
>It looks like I'm the Platonist and you're the pragmatist :).  Thats
>ok I suppose, because I've always thought of myself as a Platonist.

For confusion's sake, let's introduce a third alternative, the Nietzschen
one. The "we want to continue playing it so it continues" argument. We don't
care if anyone is playing it. We don't care if the rules even exist. We
create our own system beyond its reality or lack thereof.

Players in Acka are godlike. They create anything out of anything, including
nothingness. They decide on the system and its state irrespective of whether
it is good or bad. [Freud would have a field day with this]

> [lots of excellent points about legal and illegal game states 
> which everyone will probably agree with, myself included]

From the above, let's also point out that whatever the game state is, by
agreement of all the players, it may go to another state. For example,
assume the game is crashed and there is no rule to get out of it. If
everyone made believe that by a new interpretation of R101 (or any other I
guess) the rule set actually allows itself to be reset to the original rule
set, then it would. Since no one will challenge that interpretation, the
game has just moved to a new state and everything is well. It doesn't matter
if the interpretation would be ridiculous, so long as players agree on it.

And of course, the state change could be to anything. Which would mean there
is no "crashed" state. The case where there was no more players would be
interesting to look at... of course, it would be meaningless to everyone...
or rather, it would have meaning to all the players (ie no one).

But back to the CFJ. As Malenkai said, if it is ruled TRUE, then there is
still a grace period in which lots of things can happen, including it being
overturned. As per the [insert your favorite pejorative adjective here]
argument above, it should be ruled FALSE.

Calvin N Hobbes
part time Nietzschen

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 01:07:07 -0500 (CDT)
From: Thierry Joffrain <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord) 

Something just hit me. Anyone willing to give a shot at proving that Acka is
more than a Turing machine? Certainly, Acka can mimic a universal TM. Can it
go beyond that?

Proving this would be quite awesome. It would prove that the Universe
contains something more than TMs, and hence wasn't strictly TM itself. And
that thus neither Acka nor the RL Universe are computable?

Apologies for crashing the universe everyone.
Calvin N Hobbes

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 01:13:27 -0500
From: Mitchell Harding <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord) 

>Something just hit me. Anyone willing to give a shot at proving that Acka is
>more than a Turing machine? Certainly, Acka can mimic a universal TM. Can it
>go beyond that?
>
>Proving this would be quite awesome. It would prove that the Universe
>contains something more than TMs, and hence wasn't strictly TM itself. And
>that thus neither Acka nor the RL Universe are computable?

Obviously Acka is beyond a TM, unless you postulate that humans are TMs. In
any case, by Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, applied in a somewhat strange
manner, we shouldn't be able to prove the limitations of our own
consciousness. Acka is the sum of it's players, and it's rule set. So it is
as complex as any one of us.

It's no clear question whether we are TMs are not, primarily because an
affirmative answer would guarantee the ability to create AI, which (to my
knowledge) has not been proven...

Robert Sevin

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 07:18:48 +0000
From: "Bascule" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

> Something just hit me. Anyone willing to give a shot at proving that Acka is
> more than a Turing machine? Certainly, Acka can mimic a universal TM. Can it
> go beyond that?

Excuse my ignorance. Is a Turing machine one that can be reduced to a 
set of rules? I'm thinking of the box that communicates in Chinese, 
that has people inside rifling through card files to process 
questions from the outside, giving an output that might appear as if 
it has arisen from a human responding to the question, when it is 
really from a very complicated set of rules.

Bascule

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 01:22:31 -0500
From: Mitchell Harding <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord) 

>Excuse my ignorance. Is a Turing machine one that can be reduced to a 
>set of rules? I'm thinking of the box that communicates in Chinese, 
>that has people inside rifling through card files to process 
>questions from the outside, giving an output that might appear as if 
>it has arisen from a human responding to the question, when it is 
>really from a very complicated set of rules.

Nah, you're thinking of the Turing test. A Turing machine can be reduced to
a set of rules. Basically it's just a mathematical model of a class of
computers, theoretically (although not proven) the most computationally
powerful computer possible. Applying the concept to Acka is identical to
applying the concept to the human mind, and I imagine it will meet with
little success, considering the complexities and meta-concepts involved.

Robert Sevin

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 01:34:39 -0500 (CDT)
From: Thierry Joffrain <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord) 

>Obviously Acka is beyond a TM, unless you postulate that humans are TMs.

Are humans beyond TM? You mention Godel, but can we prove it either way for
humans? I'm not so sure.

You bring up an excellent point about AIs. If we assume AIs are beyond TM,
then by definition so are humans. Whether or not they are though is a point
for speculation perhaps. I would agree and say both humans and AIs are, a
priori, beyond TMs.

Next question. If all TMs can be considered equivalent, perhaps we can
postulate that BTM systems (beyond TMs) would also be equivalent? Thus would
a human (BTM) producing an AI (BTM) be impossible on the ground that it
would require a system knowing and describing itself completely? (and thus
transcending itself)

Hmmm. Seems that the answer would be yes, only I'm not sure if by we could
still consider that AI-maker human any longer, having transcended itself...

Sorry for taking up some completely abstract notions and patching them
together like pyjamas and chocolate, but it does sound interesting. If for
no other reason than the fact I can't stand debugging a dgemm call.       : (

Calvin N Hobbes
acknowledging RS invented the "pyjamas and chocolate" expression

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 01:41:05 -0500
From: Mitchell Harding <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord) 

>>Obviously Acka is beyond a TM, unless you postulate that humans are TMs.
>Are humans beyond TM? You mention Godel, but can we prove it either way for
>humans? I'm not so sure.

We have proven that no set of assumptions and rules is sufficient to:

a) Prove it's own correctness
b) Prove all theorems that are in fact true

In other words, using the analytical and deductive skills of our mind, we
don't know if there are inherent contradictions and we know that we can't
prove all theorems that are true. There are facts about us that we can never
know. Another way Godel's Incompleteness Theorem has been stated, I believe,
is to say that no system is self-explanatory. We won't be able to fully
describe our minds using our minds.

>Next question. If all TMs can be considered equivalent, perhaps we can
>postulate that BTM systems (beyond TMs) would also be equivalent? Thus would
>a human (BTM) producing an AI (BTM) be impossible on the ground that it
>would require a system knowing and describing itself completely? (and thus
>transcending itself)

First, we have no idea if anything beyond TMs exist. Second, it would depend
on your definition of BTM. If it is all machines beyond a TM, it would be
difficult to say. I don't think Godel's Incompleteness Theorem rules out
AIs, but it's a touchy subject.

>Calvin N Hobbes
>acknowledging RS invented the "pyjamas and chocolate" expression

Acknowledges that you got the expression incorrect. Making up expression
isn't all cake and pajamas, as you well know.

Robert Sevin

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 02:03:24 -0500 (CDT)
From: Thierry Joffrain <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord) 

> [ Godel's theorem, a given, mentioned ]

>Another way Godel's Incompleteness Theorem has been stated, I believe,
>is to say that no system is self-explanatory. We won't be able to fully
>describe our minds using our minds.

Yes, that is what I was refering to below:

>>Next question. If all TMs can be considered equivalent, perhaps we can
>>postulate that BTM systems (beyond TMs) would also be equivalent? Thus would
>>a human (BTM) producing an AI (BTM) be impossible on the ground that it
>>would require a system knowing and describing itself completely? (and thus
>>transcending itself)
>
>First, we have no idea if anything beyond TMs exist. Second, it would depend
>on your definition of BTM. If it is all machines beyond a TM, it would be
>difficult to say. I don't think Godel's Incompleteness Theorem rules out
>AIs, but it's a touchy subject.

Actually, there is an intuitive rationale for BTMs existing. Say that humans
are just TMs. Then the universe (itself a TM if there is nothing more) would
need to be able to completly describe/know itself to create humans. [insert
space for various religious outcries here] Should that be a special case by
defining the Universe as a special system? But then that's just another way
of saying there is something BTM.

Or we could perhaps argue that Godel's theorem doesn't apply to the Universe
as a whole, only to proper subsets. But that seems a tad extreme.

And then we have the case of humans (as TM systems) creating AIs (also TM
systems) thereby becoming more than TM themselves. Actually, don't humans
already transcend TMs because they've described them? Certainly, I can't be
expected to be tested on material that would require me knowing myself as a
system completely.    ; )

Didn't we talk of things which TMs cannot do, or at least being told they
are beyond simple explanation? If a machine could do even one of these
computation (or rather as a computation) then it would become BTMs. The fact
that humans can invent, describe and comprehend these would in some respect
support the notion of humans as BTMs.

>>acknowledging RS invented the "pyjamas and chocolate" expression
>
>Acknowledges that you got the expression incorrect. Making up expression
>isn't all cake and pajamas, as you well know.

Drats. Cake? Chocolate is better. I'll do a schism on that one.    : )

Just one last afterthough. Could a system not generate a system of the same
class without knowing that class completely, just having it happen by
accident, not being able to understand exactly what happened? Or did I just
reword the miracle of life?    : \

Calvin N Hobbes
who needs to go to sleep

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 03:05:11 -0500
From: Mitchell Harding <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord) 

>Actually, there is an intuitive rationale for BTMs existing. Say that humans
>are just TMs. Then the universe (itself a TM if there is nothing more) would
>need to be able to completly describe/know itself to create humans. [insert
>space for various religious outcries here] Should that be a special case by
>defining the Universe as a special system? But then that's just another way
>of saying there is something BTM.

Who said the universe created humans? Besides, I don't think it's impossible
for a TM to clone itself, as long as it was part of it's programming. Maybe
not, though. Humans can reproduce -- does that cause a contradiction? I
don't think so. At any rate, your speculation boils down to "Does every
system necessarily have a creator?" which is a metaphysical question that
cannot be definitively answered.

>Or we could perhaps argue that Godel's theorem doesn't apply to the Universe
>as a whole, only to proper subsets. But that seems a tad extreme.

I don't know why you would make such a restriction. It was proven for any
system of assumptions and rules, to my knowledge. On the other hand, like
all things, it presupposes logic, which may or may not be "correct" in the
grand scheme of things. This conversation becomes entirely too philosophical
at this point (diverging radically away from it's mathematical origins),
taking perhaps even a Nietzschian turn -- I could even make the claim that
there is no absolute truth about this (or any) matter. 

>And then we have the case of humans (as TM systems) creating AIs (also TM
>systems) thereby becoming more than TM themselves. Actually, don't humans
>already transcend TMs because they've described them?

Humans create children... I don't know if there is a problem with AIs.

>Didn't we talk of things which TMs cannot do, or at least being told they
>are beyond simple explanation? If a machine could do even one of these
>computation (or rather as a computation) then it would become BTMs. The fact
>that humans can invent, describe and comprehend these would in some respect
>support the notion of humans as BTMs.

Maybe. I'm not knowledgeable enough about the subject. We'll have to wait
and see.

>Just one last afterthough. Could a system not generate a system of the same
>class without knowing that class completely, just having it happen by
>accident, not being able to understand exactly what happened? Or did I just
>reword the miracle of life?    : \

A system can do whatever it is programmed to do. You're asking if there is a
programmer, which is impossible to answer.

The problem with discussing the universe, and metaphysical aspects of it, is
that you quickly lose the ability to prove statements, or to test
assertions, etc. Even assuming logic, which isn't a safe assumption (even
the word assumptions presupposes some notion of truth, which could be
suspect as well), we cannot say very much about the universe. Don't get me
wrong, I love philosophy, but when the day comes that a philosopher actually
absolutely convinces me of something will be the day that I go mad. Harf.

Robert Sevin

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 04:14:47 -0700 (PDT)
From: Brian Raiter <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

> Another way Godel's Incompleteness Theorem has been stated, I believe,
> is to say that no system is self-explanatory. We won't be able to fully
> describe our minds using our minds.

I'm not quite sure I follow this wording. Godel's Theorem states that
within any sufficiently complex formal system, there are true
statements that cannot be proven. But you don't need a rundown of
every true statement to describe a formal system.

> First, we have no idea if anything beyond TMs exist. Second, it
> would depend on your definition of BTM. If it is all machines
> beyond a TM, it would be difficult to say. I don't think Godel's
> Incompleteness Theorem rules out AIs, but it's a touchy subject.

A couple of philosophers have tried to argue that. I find their
arguments wholly unconvincing. Consider that Godel used the formal
system of mathematics to prove that it itself was incomplete. The fact
that a formal system is incomplete does not stop it from being able to
prove its own incompleteness; so perhaps it is with human beings.

> Actually, there is an intuitive rationale for BTMs existing. Say
> that humans are just TMs. Then the universe (itself a TM if there is
> nothing more) would need to be able to completly describe/know
> itself to create humans.

I do not follow this at all. We hardly know everything about
mathematics, but that didn't stop anyone from creating it. Would you
argue that mathematics doesn't really exist because no one has been
able to prove, say, Golbach's Conjecture?

> Actually, don't humans already transcend TMs because they've
> described them?

Not at all. The Universal Turing Machine is capable of completely
emulating any other Turing Machine, for example.

> Didn't we talk of things which TMs cannot do, or at least being told they
> are beyond simple explanation? If a machine could do even one of these
> computation (or rather as a computation) then it would become BTMs.

Sure: a Turing Machine cannot solve the halting problem, for one. But
then, neither can anything else.

So far no one has been able to describe a machine that could do
something that a Turing Machine cannot. Thus, the things that a Turing
Machine cannot do are pretty much considered to be, by definition,
beyond computation.

b

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 07 Apr 1997 09:01:13 -0500
From: Malenkai <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

Bascule wrote:

> I think that in the vast majority of cases, the Platonist and
> pragmatist arguments reduce to the same thing. I'm trying to think
> of a case where they might lead to a material difference in play -
> with Narf's paradox win claim perhaps?

Perhaps.  I think a pragmatist would rule FALSE, whereas a true platonist
would rule UNDECIDED, because just because we do not observe the paradox,
does not mean it doesn't exist, otoh, the rules do not require proof of
their non-existance to render a verdict.  The pragmatist does not
interpret a paradox, thus rules FALSE.

Excepting all the grace period stuff, the platonist could not rule TRUE,
even if he observed it to be TRUE (given the grace period stuff, we can
I suppose), because its the halting problem, just like CFJ 228 and 232.
Of course, now I realise why you and I had such a debate on the verdict
of CFJ 228, its the same argument!  (mabye I'll get to judge the next
one ;-)).

> I agree entirely with what Malenkai has written, however I think it
> is an argument for pragmatism! When the error is pointed out, we all
> have another think, and decide that the game state is something else.
> The game state has changed because we have decided that it ought to
> be something different to that which we previously thought.

No, we don't *decide* it is something else, but *realise* it is something
else.

> Yep. Supposing a meteorite hit the (flat of course) world tomorrow
> and we all die instantly - will the game continue in our absence?
> Without players to interpret the rules, I argue that the game ceases
> to exist.

No, it keeps going, but most officers break the speed rule after 3 days,
but no one ever gets put on vacation, so the game sort of festers in a
state that cannot change because the registrar will not allow players
to join to impeach everyone; the rules keep waiting for the registrar
to come back to life.

Now, there are some cases where we have legislated a sort of pramatism
- -- the publically knowable concept, where changes occur to the game state
when an officer reports the fact.  For example, 7 days after a CFJ is
accepted, a player deadbeats, but the change in the game state is not
reflected until the officer reports this fact.  This is not a case of
pragmatism, imo, but a case where the rules have legislated pragmatic
behaviour, for us mere mortal's convienence. 

Malenkai

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 10:38:44 -0400 (EDT)
From: Matt Miller <[email-masked]>
Subject: Acka: Beldin's Tailor

As Beldin's Tailor, I am modifying Beldin's Pants, as follows:

I am replacing the word "owner" with "creator".

IB

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 10:01:26 -0500 (CDT)
From: Jason Orendorff <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

On Mon, 7 Apr 1997, Thierry Joffrain wrote:
> Something just hit me. Anyone willing to give a shot at proving that Acka is
> more than a Turing machine? Certainly, Acka can mimic a universal TM. Can it
> go beyond that?
	What is a Turing machine?  I see this everywhere... science
fiction is full of it.  Ack.

- -- Mohammed

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 10:48:49 -0700
From: [email-masked] (fnord)
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

Malenkai writes:
> fnord has been chosen.

I have been chosen!  I go on to a better place!

I accept.

fnord

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 12:06:05 -0500
From: "Bollinger, John C." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Acka: twinning

I am hereby asking /dev/joe to be my evil twin.  I hope snowgod will
not be jealous -- he will always be my first, most evil, twin.

FiBOnacCi

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 12:11:45 -0500
From: "Bollinger, John C." <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

fnord writes:

> Malenkai writes:
> > fnord has been chosen.
> 
> I have been chosen!  I go on to a better place!
> 
The Claw is our master.  It decides who will stay and who will go.

FiBOnacCi

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 18:24:42 +0000
From: "Bascule" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

***WARNING*** BANDWIDTH MONSTER ON RAMPAGE ***WARNING***

Malenkai wrote:

[snip - Malenkai's assesment of the differences between pragmatic and 
Platonic verdicts for Narf's CFJ with which I agree]

> Excepting all the grace period stuff, the platonist could not rule TRUE,
> even if he observed it to be TRUE (given the grace period stuff, we can
> I suppose), because its the halting problem, just like CFJ 228 and 232.
> Of course, now I realise why you and I had such a debate on the verdict
> of CFJ 228, its the same argument!  (mabye I'll get to judge the next
> one ;-)).

You have got a long memory :) I had to have a look at the CJF archive 
to remember this... 
 
> > The game state has changed because we have decided that it ought to
> > be something different to that which we previously thought.
> 
> No, we don't *decide* it is something else, but *realise* it is something
> else.

This seems to be the crux of the issue.

My position arises from philosophy of science, as I alluded to 
before. The idea is basically as follows; I put it into the context 
of Acka afterwards:

Suppose that the universe runs according to fundamental laws, and
that scientists are trying to discover what these laws are. How do we
know when these incontrovertible laws have been discovered? We look
at the evidence, and decide what is "true". This is a key point - we
are reliant upon evidence - there is no omnipotent game-show host in
the sky to give us a cuddly toy if we get it right. The history of
science is littered however with laws (eg conservation of mass,
Newtonian physics) once considered true, that are now considered
false. Similarly, much of what we consider true today will most
likely be considered false in the future. 

It is worth noting that a theory cannot be proved true; it can only
be contradicted (Popper and falsification and all that). Those
theories considered true are those that make lots of useful
predictions and haven't yet been contradicted by new evidence. 

Personally, I couldn't care less whether a theory is considered true 
or false. I'd prefer to ask "Is it useful?". Newtonian physics, that 
notoriously wrong way of looking at the universe, is still taught in 
schools, still used by engineers, because it's useful. 

So: is the theory that the universe runs according to fundamental
laws a useful theory? In many ways yes, however it has a drawback in
that we can also predict (Popper again) that we can never be sure
that we have correctly discovered those laws. So from a philosophical
point of view, these fundamental laws may as well not exist. Occam's
razor cuts them out! The advantage of this theory (that the universe
is predictable) can be kept, and the disadvantage (the
non-falsifiable prediction of undiscoverable fundamental laws)
binned, by adopting the idea that our scientific theories are not
discoveries, waiting to happen; they are inventions of the scientist.
We use these inventions while they are useful, before something
better comes along. This way of thinking also bins the idea of a true
or false theory, along with any sort of ultimate truth. 

Whew! And so, finally, to Acka:

Suppose that Acka's game state is determined according to
fundamental laws, and that players are trying to discover what the
effects of these laws are. How do we know when we have
incontrovertibly discovered what the truth of the game-state is? We
can never be sure. Malenkai's statute of limitations now almost
removes the uncertainty beyond two weeks ago (what if an error were
discovered predating it's passage :-)) nevertheless the question
remains for any game action that has apparently occured within the
last 14 days.

So: Is the theory that Acka's game state is determined according to 
fundamental laws a useful one? It has the advantage that it predicts 
that the game state is determinable. It has the disadvantage that we 
can also predict that we cannot ever be sure of correctly determining 
this theoretical game state. Occam's razor cuts.... (It's taken me 
all this time to realise that my argument rests on Occam's razor. 
*bonk* *bonk* I've had a headache all day trying to formulate this 
argument *bonk* *bonk*)

The advantages of the above theory can be kept, and the disadvantage 
binned, by adopting a slightly different idea, that the game state is 
an invention, not a discovery. An invention founded upon evidence 
(our readings of the rules) but an invention nonetheless. 

If you made it here, congratulations. Please savage my reasoning.

Bascule

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 13:35:36 -0400 (EDT)
From: Matt Miller <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

On Mon, 7 Apr 1997, Bascule wrote:

<SNIP lots of interesting stuff>
> It is worth noting that a theory cannot be proved true; it can only
> be contradicted (Popper and falsification and all that). Those
> theories considered true are those that make lots of useful
> predictions and haven't yet been contradicted by new evidence. 

This is exactly why I shunned physics in favor of mathematics.

IB
BWG

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 12:57:20 -0500
From: "Bollinger, John C." <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

Regardless of whether the judgement determines or sets the game state,
it seems to me that CFJ 370 should probably be judged false.  It is an
opinion of the judge, and I interpret the lack of other paradox win
attempts as evidence that no player (other than, perhaps, Narf) thinks
that the game is unplayable.  In any case, the judge is not required
to _prove_ that the game is playable -- he just has to render an
opinion on the truth or falsehood of the statement, based on the
rules, game custom, and the spirit of the game.

FiBOnacCi
Expert on paradox wins
Praetor
Bronze Torch holder
Supreme Court second-stringer
First owner of the Purple Robe of Justice
has a .sig shorter than Malenkai's, but longer than most other people's

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 14:36:30 -0400 (EDT)
From: "A.K.A. TheWiz" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

>Statement:
>
>Further game play is impossible.
>
>Narf's Reasoning: 
>
>I am not required to submit my reasoning, and according to R211,

  ARGH.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 14:39:45 -0400 (EDT)
From: "A.K.A. TheWiz" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: More travelling

>I am going to the Treausry.
>
>Malenkai

  Where, exactly, might that be?  Hmm, I note travel isn't regulated by
any rule, save entering players' homes.  I am going to the bottom surface
of the universe.

- -Red Barn

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 14:42:36 -0400 (EDT)
From: "A.K.A. TheWiz" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: Customs Officer Nomination

>The political office of Customs Officer is vacant.  Despite the
>fact that a nomination is already being held, the rules direct that
>a political office nomination be held due to the vacancy.  If you
>wish to volunteer for this office, respond to this indicating that
>intention.  I will explain why I think this nomination/election will
>fill the office, and the other will not.  If you disagree, bring
>forth your reasoning, or call a CFJ; its easy to miss stuff:

  I volunteer!  (I just joined MicroNomic, MuHaHaHaHa...)

- -Red Barn

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 13:50:04 -0500 (CDT)
From: "Joseph W. DeVincentis" <devjoe>
Subject: Re: Acka: twinning

FiBOnacCi wrote:
> I am hereby asking /dev/joe to be my evil twin.  I hope snowgod will
> not be jealous -- he will always be my first, most evil, twin.

I accept FiBOnacCi as my evil twin.

/dev/joe

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 14:45:42 -0400 (EDT)
From: "A.K.A. TheWiz" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

>Unlike Malenkai, I like the "because we're playing it" argument. I
>think this is the best argument, and I believe his "we _think_ we
>are playing Acka" stuff has a problem, which is that this is always
>the case. How could we tell the difference? Who is to say better than
>us? There is no all-seeing all-knowing arbiter out there to tell us.

  Bob, where Bob is any random disinterested entity...

>There are the all-powerful-rules of course; but the last time I
>looked, the rules had yet to return even one CFJ; they have no
>existence beyond our interpretation of them. Ditto the game state:
>what we think it is defines what it is. There is no higher authority 
>to appeal to. 

  The rules, however, are the definition of Acka (though I don't recall
anything giving them formal power :), and if we are actually playing with
a modified ruleset, we're not playing Acka.  Of course, the notion of
"game custom" fudges this, too - how much deviance from the rules is still
part of the rules?

- -Red Barn

------------------------------

End of Ackanomic Digest V2 #38
******************************