Subject: Ackanomic Research Digest V2 #34
From: [email-masked] (Ackanomic Research Digest)
To: acka-research-digest

Ackanomic Research Digest   Wednesday, April 9 1997   Volume 02 : Number 034

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Date: Tue, 8 Apr 1997 13:25:33 -0500 (CDT)
From: Jason Orendorff <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: P1896 rejected (No Sanctuary)

> Yes:  7    No:  5     Present:  2   ...Proposal rejected.
	Funny; if i'd voted for it it would have passed.

- -- Mohammed

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Date: Tue, 08 Apr 1997 19:07:20 -0500
From: Malenkai <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: TM's and other BWG

** moved to [email-masked] (aka acka-research) **

Vynd wrote:

> Who said this is a formal system, anyways?  Unless Acka has rules that we
> have yet to "discover" as in Malenkai's Platonic argument,

That is not exactly my argument.  The Platonic argument is that the
game state can exist in state X, indeed is in state X, even if we 
perceive it to be in state Y.  Pertaining to rules, it is possible for
rules to exist Platonically that we don't know about, such in the case
of a rule that is created that stipulates that it not be published in
the official rules document (which Acka doesn't have, BTW, so all rules
are Platonic ;)), but this is not the normal case.  More likely is the
case where a rule has a timed amendment that we didn't realise happened,
(e.g. Museum), or, most likely, where a rule or set of rules has a 
"correct" interpretation that we have not been playing under ("correct"
being defined as that interpretation mandated by the rules); a Platonist
would say that 'we have not discovered' such rules or such correct 
rendering of the rules.

> the Acka ruleset is pretty much complete by definition.

So, *if* the Acka ruleset is a formal system, it is subject to Godel's 
Theorem.  However, as has been pointed out many times, the Acka ruleset
is not a formal system.

> You could argue that game custom and CFJs and whatnot break
> this, I suppose.  So lets pretend that we weren't going to allow anymore
> CFJs, and that game custom doesn't exist.  See, that wasn't too hard,
> now was it?

Its extremely hard, actually.  There was a time that it was argued 
that game custom *was* a regulated part of the game state, (thus not really
"game custom", but another entity in the game, just like the Magic Potato).
Given this argument, that there are no external concepts, you end up
with Godelesque paradoxi.  Rather than rehash this, CFJs 222, 227, 228 
and 232 cover this area quite nicely.  This was resolved, to some extent,
by establishing that game custom, linguistic interpretation, and
spirit of the game are external concepts (qv R 101).
 
> Lets face it, the rules of Acka are neither true nor false

Actually, I believe the rules of acka are true by definition.  Some
rules and clauses are just voided sometimes, given the truth of 
precedence resolution, because it is a truth of the rules that rules
are voided sometimes.  If 2 true clauses which contradict each other
cannot be resolved by precedence, we have a paradox (CFJ 256, CFJ 269).
If a statement basically says 'This statement is false', or 'This rule
does not apply to this rule', we have a  paradox (CFJ 184).

Malenkai
not sure if he is off topic or not :)

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Date: Tue, 8 Apr 1997 18:51:33 -0500 (CDT)
From: "Joseph W. DeVincentis" <devjoe>
Subject: Re: Acka:  P1897 accepted (Honoring All Fool's Day)

> Text of accepted proposal:
> 
> Proposal 1897
> Honoring All Fool's Day
> breadbox
> Distributed at 12:02:47 on Tuesday, 1 April 1997
> 
> This is a Modest proposal.
> 
> Replace the text of Rule 207.2 ["That's just silly"] with the following:
> 
> If an accepted proposal contains the phrase "cows eat grass", then the
> player who submitted the proposal is said to be silly, and shall score
> 5 points. However, if the proposal was also distributed by the
> Promoter on April First (All Fool's Day), the player is instead said
> to be foolish, and shall score 10 points.
> 
> {{[Remember that even if Mohammed distributes this today and it is
> accepted, it will not apply to itself (though it might apply to other
> proposals distributed after me).]}}

I note that the rule which was amended was actually 207.1, and breadbox
is silly but scores no silliness points (due to R205 section 5 -- the
proposal changed the way R207.1 awards points).

/dev/joe
Scorekeeper

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Date: Tue, 08 Apr 1997 22:24:10 -0500
From: Malenkai <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 370 (fnord)

** moving to acka-research, hoping Bascule is on that list :) **

Bascule wrote:

> This is it. I'm saying that we can never get there, because we can
> never prove that we've got there, so they might as well not be there.
> I think the two positions produce exactly the same results 99.9% of
> the time, except perhaps for differences in terminology.

Well, it gets sticker when you think about art.  Can you say that 
piece of art A, is objectively better than piece B, or is art 100%
subjective?  I would argue that the 'obvious' answer that art is 100%
subjective is not so obvious.

> If truth is not founded on some objective accuracy, what is it? The
> philosopher Bruno Latour (probably among others) describes it as the
> majority view. In the scientific case, it would be the majority of
> scientists working in a given field who would decide upon the truth
> of theories within that field. 

So in other words, the earth is flat was at one time 'truth'.  Now the
'truth' is that it is impossible to exceed the speed of light.  That
sort of 'truth' does not sit well with a Platonist like me.  This is 
another difference.  There is a 'true' shape of the earth, we may or may
not have discovered it yet.
 
> the Platonist version would be that our perception of truth changes
> over time; but I think it's far more fun to say that truth is changing :)

I think its more that terminology, though, its an attitude.  I remember
when I first started reading Roger Penrose (a mathematical physicist and
Platonist), and *thinking* that way was so much clearer.  How's that
for useless BWG :)

> Funnily enough, although it's impossible to prove that there is no
> God,

That statement has always bothered me.  I do not find it inconceivable
that the entire Platonic "game state" is knowable.

> Was it anything like this?
> 
> If truth is subjective, not objective, then given that the majority
> of people are objective-Platonists (even if they wouldn't put it
> quite like that :)) and say they are right, how can the subjective
> version of truth be true, since the subjectivists say that the
> majority are right?

No, I do not remember how it went, but it was definitely not like that.
It went something like 'assume objective truth as a premise' and it 
is tautological, but assume subjectivity, and you really don't know 
anything.  It boiled down to the old Objectivist-Kant war in the end,
and although I regrettably do not remember how it went, the Objectivist
belief self-validates somehow, perhaps trivially, whereas the subjective
side cannot ever validate itself.  So why not believe something that
could be logically consistent.  I wish I could dredge it up better.

> And my reply is that I don't care if I am wrong, [out of context edit here]

Good, seeing as how you cannot be right ;-) ;-)

Malenkai
BBWG (blathering Bandwidth-Wasting Gizz)

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Date: Tue, 8 Apr 1997 21:48:58 -0700 (PDT)
From: Brian Raiter <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: TM& NSBwG

>>> And these "functions", they don't act on any other members of the same
>>> set?  The idea that you can extract the ability of a system to refer to
>>> itself and still have something worthwhile is abhorrent, even on a little
>>> thought.  (Not that I believe you aren't thinking! ;))
>> 	You can throw functions on level 2, operators on level 3, and so 
>> on.  No worries.
>> 
>> -- Mohammed
>> 
> 
> Ok, then on level 1 we don't have a formal system?  And on level 2, where
> the functions are.. these functions can't act on each other?  This system
> is NO fun! :)
> 
> IB
> not investing the time to codify the self reference just yet

The use of levels doesn't get you anything. Remember that Godel proved
Incompleteness for any system that was as complex as Peano arithmetic,
which only includes zero, the positive integers, and addition (with
multiplication and exponents derived from there).

Part of what Godel proved is that any such system is sufficient to
create *indirect* self-reference, and is therefore vulnerable to his
Incompleteness argument.

b

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End of Ackanomic Research Digest V2 #34
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