Subject: Ackanomic Discussion Digest V2 #20
From: [email-masked] (Ackanomic Discussion Digest)
To: acka-discuss-digest

Ackanomic Discussion Digest Wednesday, March 19 1997 Volume 02 : Number 020

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Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 08:07:01 -0500
From: "Bollinger, John C." <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Acka: CFJ 356 Appeal (Supreme Court)

Malenkai wrote:

> As expected (at least by me), CFJ 356 was appealed by ThinMan (but is
> there any way we could turn arguing over CFJ 354 into a duel? :)).
> 
Care to propose debate as a G & C game?  :)

ThinMan

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 08:56:45 -0500
From: Malenkai <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 356 Appeal (Supreme Court)

ThinMan wrote:
> 
> Malenkai wrote:
> 
> > As expected (at least by me), CFJ 356 was appealed by ThinMan (but is
> > there any way we could turn arguing over CFJ 354 into a duel? :)).
> >
> Care to propose debate as a G & C game?  :)

I would like to have debate as a G & C game, however, the only debates 
that are any good are those that arise out of real game play, such as this
one.  I cannot think of a way to make it work without the debate
being artificial.

Malenkai

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 08:11:59 -0600
From: john duncan <[email-masked]>
Subject: Acka: Tornado warning

Isn't a tornado due at 8:55 A.M. EST March 20? What will we do!

Lestrade

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 09:31:44 -0500
From: "Bollinger, John C." <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Acka: CFJ 356 Appeal (Supreme Court)

CnH wrote:

> >ThinMan's Appeal Reasoning:
> >
> >I claim that CnH has applied an incorrect test to the legal issues
> >pertaining to CFJ 356.  His comments in the CFJ 354 reasoning also
> >utilize the invalid test, although it also happens to lead to the
> >correct (IMO) verdict there.
> 
> I note that the reasoning is irrelevent and no part of the official
> CFJ.
> While an appeal is to overturn a *faulty* decision. An appeal for the
> sake
> of pointing an argument wrong, to have what the appealing player
> considers a
> right judgement overturned, is, imho, silly. No offense meant, I've
> always
> though of silly as something that's ok: you know me.
> 
That is why I didn't appeal CFJ 354.  I point out the common thread
and the argument in general for the purpose of addressing whatever
implicit game custom may be associated with CFJ reasoning.

> >CnH's opinions on CFJ 354 and CFJ 356 hinged on the concept that
> >burying one of the Keys as a treasure constitutes an attempt to give
> >it to an ineligible player.  In the general case, I find CnH's
> >argument unsatisfactory -- the fact that an ineligible player _may_
> >find the treasure is shaky grounds for making the burying of it
> >constitute an attempt to give it to such a player.
> 
> Let's take an example from RL. If I take a gun and shoot it randomly,
> killing someone, the law will consider that pulling the trigger is an
> attempt to hurt someone. That is pretty logical. Why else was I
> pulling the
> trigger? Just to shoot the gun? But then there safer places to do it
> if I
> had no intention of harming anyone. Same for the keys. Saying that
> it's just
> a possibility, not a certainty, that a non elligible player may get it
> proves the point about an _attempt_, It could never be an attempt, on
> the
> other hand, if there was no way the action could lead to the key
> falling in
> the "wrong" hands. More on this (a lot lot more) later.
> 
This is actually a good example for my case.  "I take a gun and shoot
it randomly, killing someone" is so generally worded that it is
impossible to say for certain that the law will construe it any one
particular way.

Suppose, for instance, that I am in Chicago the night that the Bulls
win their fifth NBA title in the last seven years.  If I take my
(hypothetical) handgun and fire into the air in celebration (as some
Chicagoans are wont to do on such occasions) and if one of the bullets
comes back down and kills someone then the situation fits the example.
However, the worst I would likely be charged with is manslaughter, which
is specific to accidental or negligent killings.  It would certainly not
be considered an _attempt_ to hurt anyone.

> Simply "burying the key", as the CFJ was worded, does not talk of any
> restrictions imposed implicitly. While there may be restrictions in
> the map,
> that has no guarantees in the rule set. Indeed, what if the rules are
> changed? Can one change the map also? So a player could make the map
> that
> would be supposedly legal (but I say it's not), then changes the rules
> so
> that it is no longer legal. (by legal I mean "passing to an eligible
> player"). That is obviously an attempt as described in the R222.
> 
But that's the point.  You are postulating specifics that might make
a particular instance of burying a Key constitute an attempt to give
it to an ineligible player.  It is impossible to say in general that
_all_ Key buryings constistute such attempts.

In my appeal reasoning, I glossed somewhat over my objection to your
premise that placing the Key in such a way that it may be obtained
by an ineligible player must necessarilly constitute an "attempt to
transfer a Key to an ineligible player."  I will address that now:
The word "attempt" implies an _intent_ to cause the action in question.
Such intent is clearly not present in snowgod's burying, for example,
and absolutely not present in Narf's burying.  It is, therefore, not
the case that intent is present in all such buryings.

Moreover, the potential for rule or map changes does not make the state
of the Key being buried in a treasure any different from its being in
any other state.  It is _always_ possible, if unlikely, that an
ineligible player could obtain a Key by having an appropriate
self-deleting rule passed, for example.

Not only do I not agree that simply making a Key "vulnerable" constitues
an attempt to pass it to an ineligible player, but every Key is
always vulnerable.  The test applied by CnH is therefore ineffective.
This CFJ must be judged false unless an alternative test can be found
that would render every instance of Key burying as an attempt to give
the Key to an ineligible player.

> But back to my first point. To say that there could be a map that's
> legal
> and therefore the ruling cannot be determined is not quite right. The
> ruling
> is to be based on the statement, and that statement included only
> "buying as
> treasure". To have it _possibly_ undertermined, it would have required
> reading "burying as treasure with a map that restricts to only
> eligible
> players". And as I have shown, that could still be interpreted (since
> it is
> possible) as an attempt to give the key to someone that is not
> eligible.
> 
No.  Because the statement is unqualified, it must be interpreted to
apply to _every_ instance of burying a Key as a treasure.  If there is
any conceivable instance of Key burying that would not constitute an
attempt to give the Key to an ineligible player then the CFJ statement
is FALSE.

> The key [pun] is that "attempt" is a very vague word. What's an
> attempt? An
> attempt is something that is not certain to work. It's something that
> may or
> may not work. It is something that may lead to some result. I have
> clearly
> shown that burying can be considered such an attempt because it can
> always
> lead to the result of getting the key into the hands of someone who is
> not
> elligible.
> 
That description applies to "attempt," but is not a complete
description.  It neglects the element of intent that I discussed
earlier.  The rule uses the transitive verb form; Webster's relevant
definition (the 1st in the list, BTW) is "to try to do; to try to get;
to try; to endeavor; to undertake."  This clearly underscores the
element of intent associated with the word "attempt" (and also CnH's
element of uncertainty, FWIW).

> Now, a real test of the validity of the CFJ would be to ask for a
> ruling on
> what an "attempt" is in Acka. But then CFJ354 and 356 could be
> interpreted
> as already defining it.
> 
Game custom is to rely on common English usage when the rules do not
specify or imply otherwise.  I see no cause to judge that "attempt"
should be interpreted other than by common English usage, so please
refer to the definition I gave above.

> I'll give a concrete example. The Silver Key (since we are talking
> about it)
> requires the recipient to have 1 or more gadgets. All right, so I bury
> it,
> taking care of that and the non-voting player stuff in the map (plus
> whatever).
> 
> I get the rule changed to read, for the Silver Key, that there can be
> no
> player that are eligible. But the map is the map. And then, someone
> could
> find it (indeed I could find it myself), and obviously that someone
> that is
> not eligible. Burying does not "freeze" the rules.
> 
I acknowledge that the scenario described is possibile under my
interpretation of the rules.  That is irrelevant to the case at hand.
Indeed, the question of what would actually happen to the Key in such
a circumstance is not clear to me.  In any case, it is not the judge's
job to assure that the Keys cannot possibly end up in the hands of
"ineligible" players.  His job is solely to judge the truth or falsehood
of the CFJ statement in light of the rules.  The statement, and its
interpretation depend on whether or not burying a Key as treasure can
be construed, in every case, as an _attempt_ to transfer a Key to an
ineligible player.

Try out this example:

We pass some sort of locations rule, that allows me to specify that I
leave objects in my home while I'm elsewhere.  We pass a theft rule
that allows players, under certain circumstances, to obtain such
unattended objects.  If I set my key down at my place, forget about it,
and go to a party at snowgod's then does the Key snap back to the
Goose because an ineligible player _might_ steal it?  What if there
were no ineligible players at that time who could satisfy the theft
rule's requirements?

Or better:

If CnH proposes an amendment that would somehow prevent anyone from
obtaining a Key by having a proposal passed, and I vote NO, then would
I lose my Key?

I say no to both examples, especially the latter, but CnH's rendering
of "attempt" would seem to imply a YES for each.  CnH has approached
this matter with both thoughtfulness and zeal, but I think he has
come to the wrong conclusion by making a logical misstep early on in
his chain of reasoning.

ThinMan

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 10:06:47 -0500
From: "Bollinger, John C." <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Acka: CFJ 359 (breadbox)

Malenkai wrote:

> Statement:
> 
> Due to conflicts in rules 207 and 209, further game play is
> impossible.
> 
> Narf's Reasoning:
> 
> Rule 207 states that ?If a non-Modest proposal is accepted, the player
> who proposed it receives 10 points, and every player who
> voted NO on it receives 3 points. If a Modest proposal is accepted,
> the
> player who proposed it receives half as many points as he or she would
> have received otherwise, and no points are awarded for voting NO.?
> 
> While Rule 209 states ?Whenever a Modest Proposal is adopted, the
> number
> of points scored by its author as a direct result of authoring an
> adopted proposal shall be half the number of points they would
> otherwise
> have scored (rounded down).?
> 
> I assert that it is impossible to determine the correct number of
> points
> to award a player who authors an accepted modest proposal.  Rule 207
> clearly has precedence in case of conflict, but the two rules do not
> in
> fact conflict with one another.  Here is my take on the string of
> events
> following the acceptance of a modest proposal:  According to rule 207,
> the author receives half the number of points that e would have
> otherwise, or 5.  Rule 209 states that e shall receive half the number
> of points they would otherwise have scored (rounded down) or... 2.
> Since 2 is half of 5, rounded down.  Of course, no where in the rules
> does it specify the order of rule application, merely the order of
> precedence.  So... perhaps what REALLY happens is that rule 209 is
> applied first, giving the author 5 points, then rule 207 kicks in...
> and
> because rule 207 does not specify whether or not to round down, the
> player receives 2 or 3 points.  Of course, this is further complicated
> since we may not even be done at this point.  After all, neither rule
> says that the score should only be haved once.  Having halved it to 5
> (by application of either rule), in order to fully obey the rule, we
> would have to halve it again.  Now whether or not this generates a
> score
> of 2 or 3 again depends on which rule you are following and your
> interpretattion of it.
> 
> What this all leads to, in my opinion, is a situation where it is
> impossible to determine how many points the author of a modest
> proposal
> should receive, and if you disagree with that statement, the only
> number
> of points possible is 0.
> 
Let me work backwards.  First, the supposed indeterminism of the
scoring.  At the outset, I point out that game custom already specifies
a non-paradoxical interpretation of Rules 207 and 209.  If we choose to
reject that interpretation, then the following is a much better
letter-of-the-law interpretation (IMO) than the one suggested by Narf.

Accoring to Rule 209, as quoted above:
	"Whenever a Modest Proposal is adopted, the number of points
scored by its
>  author as a direct result of authoring an adopted proposal shall be
> half the
>  number of points they would otherwise have scored (rounded down)."
How many points would the author have "otherwise" scored?  What is the
scenario implied by "otherwise"?  The petitioner attempts to render
"otherwise" as "a proposal is adopted but it is not Modest."  The
negative of "a Modest Proposal is adopted" is "a Modest Proposal is
not adopted."  The rules do not specify any points to be awarded upon
the non-adoption of any kind of proposal, but they do say that scores
only change as the rules say that they do.  I also point out that
non-adoption is not the same as rejection.  Therefore, the author of
the proposal would have otherwise scored zero points, and R209 awards
half of zero, which is, of course, zero.

According to Rule 207:
	"If a Modest proposal is accepted, the player who proposed it
receives half as
>  many points as he or she would have received otherwise, and no points
> are awarded for voting NO."
This is essentially the same as R209 (which is the point of the CFJ),
and it renders the same way -- the author of a Modest Proposal scores
zero points.

I am satisfied to stick with the customary interpretation of these
rules, but if that is rejected then I still see no paradox.  Narf is
correct that the points scored by the author would be zero in that
case, but it comes directly from the rules, not from any kind of
infinite regression.

Now, with that out of the way, I point out that indeterminate scoring
would not prevent the continuation of game play.  Indeed, we have in
the past continued to play the game at times when the true scores, or
some of them at least, were unknown.  The CFJ statement is therefore
trivially FALSE, independant of any other reasoning.

ThinMan
Expert in paradox wins
Expert in non-winning paradoxes and non-determinism
Expert in rule conflicts and precedence
Expert in the judicial system

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 20:01:49 +0200 (EET)
From: Uri Bruck <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 359 (breadbox)

I think this should be judged false.

On Wed, 19 Mar 1997, Malenkai wrote:

> breadbox has been chosen.  This problem was pointed out a long time
> ago, but no one ever cleaned it up.  Is it a paradox, though...
>=20
> Clerk of the Courts
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Call For Judgement 359
> Subject: Modesty Paradox
> Initiator: Narf
>   Judge: breadbox (selected Mar 19, 1997, 9:07h EST)
> Judgement:
>=20
> Statement:
>=20
> Due to conflicts in rules 207 and 209, further game play is impossible.
>=20
> Narf's Reasoning:
>=20
> Rule 207 states that =93If a non-Modest proposal is accepted, the player
> who proposed it receives 10 points, and every player who
> voted NO on it receives 3 points. If a Modest proposal is accepted, the
> player who proposed it receives half as many points as he or she would
> have received otherwise, and no points are awarded for voting NO.=94
>=20
> While Rule 209 states =93Whenever a Modest Proposal is adopted, the numbe=
r
> of points scored by its author as a direct result of authoring an
> adopted proposal shall be half the number of points they would otherwise
> have scored (rounded down).=94
>

I agree with Narf that there is no real conflict. However I disagree with
the rest of his interpretation.
I understand otherwise to mean "if the propoal weren't Modest".
The sentences appear quite clear to me. Both rules say somethine like "In
a case of a Modest proposal do this, otherwise do that"  so the string of
events described by Narf does not occur, because neither rule is an
exception for the other. In fact they describe the same thing. If they
were described as procedures (e.g. "the number of points is halved") than
I would argue that this procedure is applied once per each rule, or a
total number of two times. Since they do not describe a procedure, but
rather a situation, and specifically the 'otherwise' clause in each does
not refer to the other, then they simply happen to be two rules which
agree with each other. Suppose we had a R2001 which had identical text to
R101. Would this create a paradox? It's not very aesthetic, but it's not a
paradox.

Niccolo Flychuck

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 12:23:56 -0600 (CST)
From: "Joseph W. DeVincentis" <devjoe>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 359 (breadbox)

ThinMan wrote:
> > Statement:
> > 
> > Due to conflicts in rules 207 and 209, further game play is
> > impossible.
> > 
> > Narf's Reasoning:
> > 
> > Rule 207 states that ?If a non-Modest proposal is accepted, the player
> > who proposed it receives 10 points, and every player who voted NO on
> > it receives 3 points. If a Modest proposal is accepted, the
> > player who proposed it receives half as many points as he or she would
> > have received otherwise, and no points are awarded for voting NO.?
> > 
> > While Rule 209 states ?Whenever a Modest Proposal is adopted, the
> > number of points scored by its author as a direct result of authoring an
> > adopted proposal shall be half the number of points they would
> > otherwise have scored (rounded down).?
> > 
> > I assert that it is impossible to determine the correct number of
> > points to award a player who authors an accepted modest proposal.

> Accoring to Rule 209, as quoted above:
> How many points would the author have "otherwise" scored?  What is the
> scenario implied by "otherwise"?  The petitioner attempts to render
> "otherwise" as "a proposal is adopted but it is not Modest."  The
> negative of "a Modest Proposal is adopted" is "a Modest Proposal is
> not adopted."

Actually, he renders "otherwise" as "a Modest proposal is adopted but this
rule (or section of a rule) was not here".  If "otherwise" meant "a proposal
is adopted but it is not Modest", then the rules would not conflict; both
rules would say that the proper number of points would be half the number
of points he would have gotten if the proposal were non-Modest, with the
only difference being that Rule 209 says to round down, while rule 207
does not specify how to handle the case of an odd number of points being
halved.

Furthermore, under the "a Modest proposal is adopted but this rule/section
was not here" reading, there is no paradox.  Both rule 207 and rule 209 are
trying to change the number of points scored at the same time; rule 207 has
precedence, so it operates first, halving the score.  To determine the
score to be halved, consider the case where R207's halving effect is not
present -- then just R209's halving is there.  To determine the score for
R209 to halve, consider the case where neither "halving" effect exists,
i.e., the normal scoring for a proposal.  R209 halves this, rounding down,
and then R207 halves that again.  R207 does not say how to round, but game
custom is that we round such halved scores down.  However, game custom also
goes against this interpretation of "otherwise".

/dev/joe

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 13:30:25 -0500 (EST)
From: mr cwm <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 359 (breadbox)

On Wed, 19 Mar 1997, Niccolo Flychuck wrote:

>
>I agree with Narf that there is no real conflict. However I disagree with
>the rest of his interpretation.
>I understand otherwise to mean "if the propoal weren't Modest".
>The sentences appear quite clear to me. Both rules say somethine like "In
>a case of a Modest proposal do this, otherwise do that"  so the string of
>events described by Narf does not occur, because neither rule is an
>exception for the other. In fact they describe the same thing. If they
>were described as procedures (e.g. "the number of points is halved") than
>I would argue that this procedure is applied once per each rule, or a
>total number of two times. Since they do not describe a procedure, but
>rather a situation, and specifically the 'otherwise' clause in each does
>not refer to the other, then they simply happen to be two rules which
>agree with each other. Suppose we had a R2001 which had identical text to
>R101. Would this create a paradox? It's not very aesthetic, but it's not a
>paradox.
>

But would that mean we have to obey all the rules twice? :) I don't think
so.  Even if the two rules actually in question did describe procedures, I
think the fact that it's the same procedure would mean it's only carried
out once, in the absence of "in addition to the effects of all other
rules"-type clauses.

- -mr cwm

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 14:27:32 -0500
From: Dan Knapp (A.K.A. TheWiz) <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 356 Appeal (Supreme Court) 

> > Care to propose debate as a G & C game?  :)
>
> I would like to have debate as a G & C game, however, the only debates
> that are any good are those that arise out of real game play, such as this
> one.  I cannot think of a way to make it work without the debate
> being artificial.

  Easy.  Just have the debate be based on real game play, but not affect
anything (except perhaps people's opinions).  Not ideal, but workable.

- -Red Barn

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 14:28:32 -0500
From: Dan Knapp (A.K.A. TheWiz) <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re:Acka: CFJ 358 (Red Barn) 

At 9:00 AM on 3/19/97, Malenkai wrote:

> Red Barn has been chosen.
>
> Clerk of the Courts
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Call For Judgement 358
>   Subject: Crazy French-Scotsman and the End of the Cycle
> Initiator: Vynd
>     Judge: Red Barn (selected Mar 19, 1997, 9:02h EST)
> Judgement:

  I accept.

- -Red Barn

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 14:59:54 -0500
From: "Bollinger, John C." <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Acka: CFJ 359 (breadbox)

/dev/joe wrote:
[I wrote:]
> > Accoring to Rule 209, as quoted above:
> > How many points would the author have "otherwise" scored?  What is
> the
> > scenario implied by "otherwise"?  The petitioner attempts to render
> > "otherwise" as "a proposal is adopted but it is not Modest."  The
> > negative of "a Modest Proposal is adopted" is "a Modest Proposal is
> > not adopted."
> 
> Actually, he renders "otherwise" as "a Modest proposal is adopted but
> this
> rule (or section of a rule) was not here".  If "otherwise" meant "a
> proposal
> is adopted but it is not Modest", then the rules would not conflict;
> both
> rules would say that the proper number of points would be half the
> number
> of points he would have gotten if the proposal were non-Modest, with
> the
> only difference being that Rule 209 says to round down, while rule 207
> does not specify how to handle the case of an odd number of points
> being
> halved.
> 
We all agree that the rules do not conflict.  I suppose that I offered
the particular interpretations of Narf's renderings that I did because
they seemed the ones closest to his argument that might reasonably be
obtained from the actual wording.  As I consider, I guess that /dev/joe
comes closer to the mark, although farther from any rendering that I
would consider reasonable based on the rule text itself.

> Furthermore, under the "a Modest proposal is adopted but this
> rule/section
> was not here" reading, there is no paradox.  Both rule 207 and rule
> 209 are
> trying to change the number of points scored at the same time; rule
> 207 has
> precedence, so it operates first, halving the score.
> 
This, however, I find unconvincing.  I nowhere see anything that
specifies that rules should be applied in precedence order.  I find it
much more reasonable to take the view that insomuch as the two rules
coincide, they describe the _same_ event. 

> However, game custom also goes against this interpretation of
> "otherwise".
> 
This is, IMO, the most fundamental answer to the question -- the
interpretation of Rules 207 and 209 is already established in game
custom.  The burden is on Narf to show how the customary interpretation
is not consistent with the rules.  It is not sufficient to provide an
alternative interpretation, even if it is a "better" one by some
measure.  Narf must show why the customary interpretation is _wrong_.

ThinMan

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 00:05:58 +0200 (EET)
From: Uri Bruck <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 359 (breadbox)

On Wed, 19 Mar 1997, mr cwm wrote:

> 
> But would that mean we have to obey all the rules twice? :) I don't think
> so.  Even if the two rules actually in question did describe procedures, I
> think the fact that it's the same procedure would mean it's only carried
> out once, in the absence of "in addition to the effects of all other
> rules"-type clauses.
> 
> -mr cwm
> 
In the specific example I cited, cloning R101, I'd agree, it's not a
procedural rule rule.  The point I was making that this would be true for
all non-procedural rules, and specifically for R207,R209, for which I
showed earlier why they are not procedural rules.

The question of whether two or more identical procedural rules describe
the same procedure or identical procedures, although not necessarily with
identical results, since the game state at the time the procedure is
initiated may not be the same (there was a CFJ about R666 about this way
back in July, I think), is a question that has no bearing on the CFJ to
which I originally responded, yet it is a question to which I believe
there is no single answer that can cover all eventualities, unless such an
answer is either ground in game custom, or explicitly legislated, and in
the latter case, provides sufficient tests to determine whether or not the
procedures are really identical.

Niccolo Flychuck Niccolo Flychuck

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 15:06:11 -0800 (PST)
From: Brian Raiter <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Acka: CFJ 359 (breadbox)

This is weird. My CFJ ruling is being debated, but Malenkai hasn't
distributed it yet. Is there a mailing list I'm not on?

b

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 17:34:15 -0600 (CST)
From: Thierry Joffrain <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Acka: CFJ 356 Appeal (Supreme Court) 

ThinMan

Thanks for bringing up some excellent points. This has to be one of the best
debates I've been involved in thus far. I think that I may even concede it,
given that several points are resolved. Reasons to follow below.

My apologies to everyone. This was a tiny little message when I did the
first draft. But it grew. A lot. And then some more. Sorry.

>That is why I didn't appeal CFJ 354.  I point out the common thread
>and the argument in general for the purpose of addressing whatever
>implicit game custom may be associated with CFJ reasoning.

I see. Well, perhaps there should be a special type of appeal that will
correct reasoning rather than judgement. Perhaps by having Justices just add
a correction afterwards.

>This is actually a good example for my case.  "I take a gun and shoot
>it randomly, killing someone" is so generally worded that it is
>impossible to say for certain that the law will construe it any one
>particular way.

I agree that the final verdict may be almost anything, from community
service to the electric chair. However, the fact is that someone has been
killed. I know that the law, by default, assumes manslaughter (not to be
parsed as "man's laughter" [grin]), but that the defense has to prove
insanity/reasonable doubt/whatever that this was accidental and thus that
the sentence should be less. The prosecution has to prove intent (which you
mention) to get a conviction of outright murder.

This goes back to "innocent until proven guilty". The only fact in our
example is that someone was killed, so it's manslaughter. Getting stricter
punishment, or less, requires proof on either side.

As for the Key, I can see a similar argument, which you develop later on.
That intent need be proved in the player's action. This is an inherently
difficult question if we are going to sort it out this way and we would be
pushing Acka into a very complex realm indeed. Which I welcome!

Just three things I can bring up.

First, that this may be too complex an undertaking in the format of a CFJ.
Even what could seem like a simple error could be the result of careful
planning and cunning on the part of a player. Question is, do we want to
punish by default, or do we want to punish only those that are guilty beyond
any doubt (not _just_ reasonable doubt, that's the defense).

I've always vigorously stated (perhaps not here though) that I'd rather see
a guilty man walk than risk an innocent being convicted. So I would require
a very stringent test of intent.

Second, that this is going way too far for something that is _not_ a crime.
This is just to decide what thread we go into! The ruling I made would
perhaps be very restrictive of actual possible ways to transfer, but at
least it ensures we don't have any vague or undetermined solution that leads
to more problems down the road. This isn't a great reason, but it has merit.

Third, that the ruling I made would stop, cleanly, within the existing
working frames, all the questions with the current situation. As I have
argued, my interpretation of intent is broad, perhaps too much, but it can
be argued that way. Bringing in "intent" does round things off nicely about
the meaning of "intent", but it's a tough thing that we can't judge properly
right now. Or rather that we could only arbitrarily judge right now. So in
that sense, my ruling is good for the game. (perhaps, maybe, arguably,
supposedly, etc, etc, etc)

>Suppose, for instance, that I am in Chicago the night that the Bulls
>win their fifth NBA title in the last seven years.  If I take my
>(hypothetical) handgun and fire into the air in celebration (as some
>Chicagoans are wont to do on such occasions) and if one of the bullets
>comes back down and kills someone then the situation fits the example.
>However, the worst I would likely be charged with is manslaughter, which
>is specific to accidental or negligent killings.  It would certainly not
>be considered an _attempt_ to hurt anyone.

That depends on the lawyers you can afford actually.    : )

Seriously, it may be considered just an accident, but what if the
prosecution can show that you have either a history of violent behavior or a
connection to the person that was killed, however distant, that may be
motive enough to kill? In both cases, the killer's fate lies in the hands of
the jury. Like I said, this is a very complex system to go into.

Can I show snowgod has a history of trying to cunningly sneak by some rules
for example? Could this convince a jury? Should we go to this depth for such
a situation?

>In my appeal reasoning, I glossed somewhat over my objection to your
>premise that placing the Key in such a way that it may be obtained
>by an ineligible player must necessarilly constitute an "attempt to
>transfer a Key to an ineligible player."  I will address that now:
>The word "attempt" implies an _intent_ to cause the action in question.
>Such intent is clearly not present in snowgod's burying, for example,
>and absolutely not present in Narf's burying.  It is, therefore, not
>the case that intent is present in all such buryings.

I now see where you are coming from exactly (I think). And this is a very
valid argument. The question is, how do we want to interpret 'attempt'
*exactly*. How far, how strict, how lax do we want it to be? Isn't Narf
laughing at us for not seeing through he deviously clever plan? Whose job is
it to prove that? Whose job is it to judge that? By what guidelines? RL?
Which? Democratic (innocent till proven guilty)? Communist (guilty till we
change gov)? Oligarchic (he is influential, so innocent)? Monarchist (he is
speaker/president so innocent)? Plutocractic (he's got money, so he's
innocent)? Big dilemmas. (and I need to enjoy making lists a little less)
(and using brakets)    : ]

By being strict (perhaps too much so), I did close the door on a lot of
possible problems. And I still think that the interpretation of 'attempt' I
made is a valid one... to a point. You have outlined this point very clearly
and now that I'm looking at it, I have to wonder if I like it where it is.

Right now, I'd be relieved to see the Supreme Court rule in favor of my
original verdict because it's simpler to use (if it can happen -> boom)
rather than the more complex test (if intentional -> boom). I'd even go as
far as to say that this intent thing should go to a trial format (oh the
workload) if we go that way. On the other hand, I'd be very happy to see it
overturned. This could be the next Judicial System revolution and I'd love
to see it.

Perhaps that's carrying it too far, but I don't see any other way of dealing
with things like intent and recognizing simple errors for what they are
without it.

>Moreover, the potential for rule or map changes does not make the state
>of the Key being buried in a treasure any different from its being in
>any other state.  It is _always_ possible, if unlikely, that an
>ineligible player could obtain a Key by having an appropriate
>self-deleting rule passed, for example.

True indeed. A map change rule is interesting and problematic, yes. The last
point does not deal with burying, or the action of the owning player so not
within the realm of the CFJ. To note though, an owner can give a key to
another eligible player. That transfer has no way to end up in the wrong hands.

>Not only do I not agree that simply making a Key "vulnerable" constitutes
>an attempt to pass it to an ineligible player, but every Key is
>always vulnerable.

To a certain extend, yes. Not always though, since I believe until a key is
removed from the Goose's neck, it's safe, only the Goose owner can remove it
(to give them away).

>  The test applied by CnH is therefore ineffective.

That's not true though. The explicit, legitimate ways of passing the key
along remain, unchanged and are actually strengthened as the only legitimate
ways to pass along the keys. That's a good thing imho, since we won't have
to constantly second guess (i) the action and reasons of the player and (ii)
they are well defined.

>This CFJ must be judged false unless an alternative test can be found
>that would render every instance of Key burying as an attempt to give
>the Key to an ineligible player.

Amend R222 to say that any way of manipulating Keys not as specified by the
rules are attempts to give it to non-eligible players. That calls the
sentence I was using, and resolves all problems. If you don't like it as
that, it could be rephrased to replace the sentence from R222 I was using,
saying "manipulating the keys in ways not explicitly specified by this rule
results in that key being immediately returned to the Goose."

>> But back to my first point. To say that there could be a map that's
>> legal
>> and therefore the ruling cannot be determined is not quite right. The
>> ruling
>> is to be based on the statement, and that statement included only
>> "buying as
>> treasure". To have it _possibly_ undetermined, it would have required
>> reading "burying as treasure with a map that restricts to only
>> eligible
>> players". And as I have shown, that could still be interpreted (since
>> it is
>> possible) as an attempt to give the key to someone that is not
>> eligible.
>> 
>No.  Because the statement is unqualified, it must be interpreted to
>apply to _every_ instance of burying a Key as a treasure.  If there is
>any conceivable instance of Key burying that would not constitute an
>attempt to give the Key to an ineligible player then the CFJ statement
>is FALSE.

See, I agree with your saying it need apply to every instance, but not on
what the result should be in that case. You say that unless it's clear in
every instance (that it was trying to go to a non-eligible player), it's not
an attempt. I say that unless it's clear in every instance (that it was
trying to go to an eligible player), it is an attempt.

Similar but critically different.

>That description applies to "attempt," but is not a complete
>description.  It neglects the element of intent that I discussed
>earlier.  The rule uses the transitive verb form; Webster's relevant
>definition (the 1st in the list, BTW) is "to try to do; to try to get;
>to try; to endeavor; to undertake."  This clearly underscores the
>element of intent associated with the word "attempt" (and also CnH's
>element of uncertainty, FWIW).

That is true. But how does one judge between attempt and possible attempt,
reasonable doubt or even simple error by a player?

>> Now, a real test of the validity of the CFJ would be to ask for a
>> ruling on
>> what an "attempt" is in Acka. But then CFJ354 and 356 could be
>> interpreted
>> as already defining it.
>> 
>Game custom is to rely on common English usage when the rules do not
>specify or imply otherwise.  I see no cause to judge that "attempt"
>should be interpreted other than by common English usage, so please
>refer to the definition I gave above.

Yes, but it also needs to be in the "spirit of the game" (same rule). What
just occurred to me is that while I may be in favor of lenient judgements,
Acka is no such place. Heretics have been burned with more than probable
doubt as to their innocence. Hearings, CFCJs have been called on what were
obviously simple errors that had no intent behind them. True, these don't
require to show "attempt", but it's game custom to punish swiftly and punish
in excess.

>I acknowledge that the scenario described is possibile under my
>interpretation of the rules.  That is irrelevant to the case at hand.
>Indeed, the question of what would actually happen to the Key in such
>a circumstance is not clear to me.

But under the test I proposed, it is clear. There is no doubt. If there was,
it's an attempt. Seems to me like we're on a razor edge and I'm not sure I'd
like to go on either side. Can we keep walking the edge I wonder.

>  In any case, it is not the judge's
>job to assure that the Keys cannot possibly end up in the hands of
>"ineligible" players.  His job is solely to judge the truth or falsehood
>of the CFJ statement in light of the rules.  The statement, and its
>interpretation depend on whether or not burying a Key as treasure can
>be construed, in every case, as an _attempt_ to transfer a Key to an
>ineligible player.

I do not agree with the last part of that statement. As I said, I think it
should be to make sure that in every case, it should NOT be able to be
transferred to an ineligible player. The reason is R222 itself, which
clearly states that an ineligible player cannot receive a key. This is in
accord with the rules, as we both agree it needs to be. I think your case is
way too lenient. I think mine may be way too strict. I think the
unacceptable compromise is to introduce trials by jury.

>We pass some sort of locations rule, that allows me to specify that I
>leave objects in my home while I'm elsewhere.  We pass a theft rule
>that allows players, under certain circumstances, to obtain such
>unattended objects.  If I set my key down at my place, forget about it,
>and go to a party at snowgod's then does the Key snap back to the
>Goose because an ineligible player _might_ steal it?  What if there
>were no ineligible players at that time who could satisfy the theft
>rule's requirements?

Could you prove that you did not try to orchestrate a theft? Is negligence
just a botched up attempt, just as plain negligence of children is a crime
in RL? (who should prove these things in fact!) Will your transactions show
no sign of cash or entity gifts from a thief (after the key is stolen),
either in the past of future? Will you never accept a position offered to
you by that player (since it could be a delayed payment)? Etc.

That is the idea behind intent and it is very hard to prove. Was it not
stolen just because the would be thief didn't get online that day? Where do
we draw the line now?

>If CnH proposes an amendment that would somehow prevent anyone from
>obtaining a Key by having a proposal passed, and I vote NO, then would
>I lose my Key?

The rule would have to, as an action, order a transfer from you to the Goose
and it would obviously need to pass. What your vote counts for is not
important because even by voting NO, it can't be construed as an attempt to
give the key to someone that is ineligible at the time the vote takes place.
Serious temporal chronology question here perhaps.

On the other hand, having you vote YES on a proposal that would transfer
your key to someone that is ineligible, without making the player eligible
and irrespective of whether the rule passed or not, then I'd have to say
that yes, that is certainly an attempt. And with intent too I might add.

>I say no to both examples, especially the latter, but CnH's rendering
>of "attempt" would seem to imply a YES for each.

In the first one, yes, my ruling does imply a YES. I have outlined many
questions raised by asking for intent though. As for the second, it would be
no, unless you give me more info about the proposal, yet I doubt your own
vote is the problem. My example does lead to a resolution you will probably
not like however.

>  CnH has approached
>this matter with both thoughtfulness and zeal, but I think he has
>come to the wrong conclusion by making a logical misstep early on in
>his chain of reasoning.

Ooooooo. [the crowd is on it's feet... the crowd roars!]

I'm willing to go with "intent", but some serious guidelines are going to be
needed. That should absolve me of my arguable misstep.

I'd also like to point out that you and I are arguing about the reasoning of
the CFJ. I'd to note that R217, which deals with what the Supreme Court
court should consider. Sorry for just adding lots of stuff at the end like
that (it's fun):

>The player may include with his appeal any such material he 
>deems relevant to the case. The Court is under no obligation 
>to consider such material, and should use normal procedures 
>to determine a verdict. 

Normal procedures are outlined in R215:

>All Judgements must be in accordance with all the rules in 
>effect at the time judgement was invoked, and with respect to
>the game state at that time. When the rules are silent, 
>inconsistent, or unclear on the statement in question, however,
>then the Judge shall consider currently existing game custom 
>and the spirit of the game in reaching a decision. 

And the rules state in R214:

>A Judgement may be accompanied by reasons and 
>arguments, but any such reasons and arguments form no 
>part of the official Judgement itself. 

So the appeal of the Judgement, which an appeal of the CFJ is, cannot
consider an error in the judge's reasoning if the ruling is still the
correct one (if there is even one). This is intuitively correct. Just
because a judge rules FALSE for "CnH has won the game" with the reasoning
"There is no R101", the judgement can't be overturned because of the wrong
reasoning.

Although I'd like to see it work that way.    : )

After this interlude, just to recap. I'm don't care either way how this
goes, I can see reasons for and against in both cases. Indeed, you made a
pretty solid argument ThinMan. I've brought up various objections (three I
think), none as eloquent as your critique though.

This could be cool.

Calvin N Hobbes
halted in his tracks, thumbing through law books and rules

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End of Ackanomic Discussion Digest V2 #20
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