acka-research Digest Wednesday, January 20 1999 Volume 04 : Issue 015 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: The Karaoke Kid Subject: Re: acka-voting Digest V4 #18 Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 00:32:58 -0500 (EST) I resist the urge to breath fire. Jack Rudd President of the unofficial Jackie Woodburne Fan Club ---------------------------------------------------- X^n+Y^n=Z^n: no integer solutions for n>2. I have discovered a truly remarkable proof of this, but it won't fit into my sig file. ---------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ From: "Duncan C. \"Slakko\" Richer" Subject: Acka: More Reform Suggestions Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 07:29:55 -0500 (EST) What do people think about the following Vote Economy: Everyone has a Vote Characteristic. Default value is 2. Players may raise their Vote Characteristic by 1 at a cost of A$3000. They may lower their Vote Characteristic by 1 to receive A$2500. No player may lower their Vote Characteristic to 0. No player may raise their Vote Characteristic to a number greater than 50% of the number of Active Players. If ever a player's Vote Characteristic reaches such a level, then it will be reduced until there is no longer a problem. The number of votes cast in a particular way (FOR, AGAINST, or BAA) is equal to the sum of the Vote Characteristics of the players who voted that way. If people feel that this is too open to scamation, I suggest the following safeguard: Any player who has won a Cycle may Annoy a Proposal as a public action, provided the proposal is in its voting period. If any Proposal has been Annoyed by (some number, say 4) players then it is vetoed and removed from voting consideration. Comments? Suggestions? -- Duncan C. "Slakko" Richer - http://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/~dcr24/ Queens' College Cambridge, 2nd Year Ph.D. (Pure Maths) - Graph Theory Ackanomic - Web-Harfer, ChessUmpire, Map-Harfer, Clerk of the Court ------------------------------ From: Matt Miller Subject: Re: Acka: More Reform Suggestions Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 08:58:03 -0500 (EST) On Wed, 20 Jan 1999, Duncan C. "Slakko" Richer wrote: > What do people think about the following Vote Economy: > > Everyone has a Vote Characteristic. Default value is 2. > Players may raise their Vote Characteristic by 1 at a cost of A$3000. > They may lower their Vote Characteristic by 1 to receive A$2500. > No player may lower their Vote Characteristic to 0. > > No player may raise their Vote Characteristic to a number greater than > 50% of the number of Active Players. If ever a player's Vote > Characteristic reaches such a level, then it will be reduced until there > is no longer a problem. > > The number of votes cast in a particular way (FOR, AGAINST, or BAA) is > equal to the sum of the Vote Characteristics of the players who voted that > way. > > If people feel that this is too open to scamation, I suggest the following > safeguard: > > Any player who has won a Cycle may Annoy a Proposal as a public action, > provided the proposal is in its voting period. If any Proposal has been > Annoyed by (some number, say 4) players then it is vetoed and removed from > voting consideration. > > Comments? Suggestions? I like the up-front costs. But I would also suggest that it makes sense to have a recurring cost. I know, I know, everyone thinks it -horrible- to make people pay for voting. Everyone also thinks it's -horrible- that older players might somehow have an advantage of newer players. Just so it's clear, I think both objections are silly. IB ------------------------------ From: "Duncan C. \"Slakko\" Richer" Subject: Re: Acka: More Reform Suggestions Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 09:05:40 -0500 (EST) On Wed, 20 Jan 1999, Matt Miller wrote: > On Wed, 20 Jan 1999, Duncan C. "Slakko" Richer wrote: > > > What do people think about the following Vote Economy: > > > > Everyone has a Vote Characteristic. Default value is 2. > > Players may raise their Vote Characteristic by 1 at a cost of A$3000. > > They may lower their Vote Characteristic by 1 to receive A$2500. > > No player may lower their Vote Characteristic to 0. > > > > No player may raise their Vote Characteristic to a number greater than > > 50% of the number of Active Players. If ever a player's Vote > > Characteristic reaches such a level, then it will be reduced until there > > is no longer a problem. > > > > The number of votes cast in a particular way (FOR, AGAINST, or BAA) is > > equal to the sum of the Vote Characteristics of the players who voted that > > way. > > > > If people feel that this is too open to scamation, I suggest the following > > safeguard: > > > > Any player who has won a Cycle may Annoy a Proposal as a public action, > > provided the proposal is in its voting period. If any Proposal has been > > Annoyed by (some number, say 4) players then it is vetoed and removed from > > voting consideration. > > > > Comments? Suggestions? > > I like the up-front costs. But I would also suggest that it makes sense > to have a recurring cost. I know, I know, everyone thinks it -horrible- > to make people pay for voting. Everyone also thinks it's -horrible- that > older players might somehow have an advantage of newer players. Given the number of old players who have left recently, acquisition of a couple more players probably wouldn't hurt. We should be careful not to make any disadvantages all that huge. My paying for voting "nightmare" is the scenario where a particular scam leaves only one player with positive cash. It turns a cash-based scam into one which allows control over the entire ruleset. The veto safeguard I have suggested would banish that nightmare, of course. > > Just so it's clear, I think both objections are silly. Interestingly, if we have some kind of interest-bearing A$ system, then the recurring cost can be subsumed into the initial cost so that we have the same effect as a recurring cost, but without the extra harfing that would be involved. I think one important argument regarding recurring voting costs is the amount of extra harfwork they'll result in. All votes will not only have to be checked against the Registrar's list to determine voting eligibility, but also against the Financier's list to determine liquidity. Then again, the system above would also require a second check (against the Dungeon Master's stats). However, the Financial details change very often, at least compared with characteristics, so I think that a regular voting cost might be too much work. Not that I'm against it on principle, though. Provided there's some kind of reasonable balance so we don't drive ourselves broke. -- Duncan C. "Slakko" Richer - http://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/~dcr24/ Queens' College Cambridge, 2nd Year Ph.D. (Pure Maths) - Graph Theory Ackanomic - Web-Harfer, ChessUmpire, Map-Harfer, Clerk of the Court ------------------------------ From: Matt Miller Subject: Re: Acka: More Reform Suggestions Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 10:25:29 -0500 (EST) On Wed, 20 Jan 1999, Duncan C. "Slakko" Richer wrote: > Given the number of old players who have left recently, acquisition of a > couple more players probably wouldn't hurt. We should be careful not to > make any disadvantages all that huge. Right-o. But where is the incentive for older players is the part which most people seem to miss. If we focus on making a "level playing field" for all players, there is no inherent advantage to those players who have stuck around for a while. Such advantages make the game MORE fun in my opinion. Not that I would suggest some sort of seniority system. I think that is a pretty poor idea. I just think it makes sense to allow players to create advantages for themselves (by hoarding cash, or whatever) and not insist on attenuating that with giving more things to new players. I've rambled enough on that. > > My paying for voting "nightmare" is the scenario where a particular scam > leaves only one player with positive cash. It turns a cash-based scam > into one which allows control over the entire ruleset. The veto safeguard > I have suggested would banish that nightmare, of course. Agreed. That is a problem which would need a workaround/fix, whatever. It's always the endpoints, isn't it? > Interestingly, if we have some kind of interest-bearing A$ system, then > the recurring cost can be subsumed into the initial cost so that we > have the same effect as a recurring cost, but without the extra harfing > that would be involved. I'm not sure how you would do that. My notion of recurring vost was associated with -using- the "votes"... I suppose we could tax on them whether they chose to use them or not, maybe that's an even better idea. My notion is similar to else's "point pool" of some time back. Where funds are used to support or reject proposals. A possible bot command: #vote 4018 100y That would place A$100 on the yes side. Whichever side has the appropriate number of A$ (55% yes, etc.) gets the nod. The Characteristic would serve as a limit on the number of votes/A$ you can cast. (I think I like the symmetry of requiring large number of A$ to increment your ability to use A$ for voting.) > I think one important argument regarding recurring voting costs is the > amount of extra harfwork they'll result in. All votes will not only have > to be checked against the Registrar's list to determine voting > eligibility, but also against the Financier's list to determine liquidity. > Then again, the system above would also require a second check (against > the Dungeon Master's stats). However, the Financial details change very > often, at least compared with characteristics, so I think that a regular > voting cost might be too much work. This is true. I don't know if it would be possible for /dev/joe to build in an interface to allow the financier to keep those records up to date. Automation can sometimes lead to anamolies, I am aware. I'd hate to require the Financier to review all the votes for fraud before they were released. Perhaps the answer is to make it a Crime of Fraud to spend A$ which you don't have. I'm tired of things merely being "impossible" under the rules, it seems to make players more reliant on the hard work of the harfers. Do your own research, make sure what you propose is possible, otherwise face the CFCJ. Maybe we should get a Prosecuter (Soliciter?). He would accept complaints from the harfers about players doing illegal things and get them CFCJd. The reason I suggest a Prosecutor, is I would like them to have some latitude to accept "plea bargains" on behalf of Ackanomic.. speeding Justice. > Not that I'm against it on principle, though. Provided there's some kind > of reasonable balance so we don't drive ourselves broke. Right, well, under a voting/pooling mechanism, the proceeds (or spoils) could be split amongst the winners. This would create a "flow voting" phenomenon. Also, a BAA! vote could be free, and entitle you to a split on the "take"... This would create a way for players to "earn" A$, merely by voting. Would it encourage BAA! voting? Probably. Is that a bad thing? Not necessarily. IB my box of hammers has 101 ideas today ------------------------------ From: "Duncan C. \"Slakko\" Richer" Subject: Re: Acka: More Reform Suggestions Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 10:52:43 -0500 (EST) On Wed, 20 Jan 1999, Matt Miller wrote: > On Wed, 20 Jan 1999, Duncan C. "Slakko" Richer wrote: > > > Given the number of old players who have left recently, acquisition of a > > couple more players probably wouldn't hurt. We should be careful not to > > make any disadvantages all that huge. > > Right-o. But where is the incentive for older players is the part which > most people seem to miss. If we focus on making a "level playing field" > for all players, there is no inherent advantage to those players who have > stuck around for a while. Such advantages make the game MORE fun in my > opinion. It might also encourage older players to return to the game if we offered them a bonus cut (e.g. any Elders who return receive double the amount a newbie would). > Not that I would suggest some sort of seniority system. I think that is a > pretty poor idea. I just think it makes sense to allow players to create > advantages for themselves (by hoarding cash, or whatever) and not insist > on attenuating that with giving more things to new players. I've rambled > enough on that. No enforced seniority. Cash-based seniority sounds interesting (or at least past cash). Another wacky idea: Each player has a Class, equal to the size of their Home (i.e. small < cosy < ... < extravagant). You can pay to raise the Class of proposals (which are small by default). Only players with the appropriate (or higher) Class can vote on that proposal. > > My paying for voting "nightmare" is the scenario where a particular scam > > leaves only one player with positive cash. It turns a cash-based scam > > into one which allows control over the entire ruleset. The veto safeguard > > I have suggested would banish that nightmare, of course. > > Agreed. That is a problem which would need a workaround/fix, whatever. > It's always the endpoints, isn't it? > > > Interestingly, if we have some kind of interest-bearing A$ system, then > > the recurring cost can be subsumed into the initial cost so that we > > have the same effect as a recurring cost, but without the extra harfing > > that would be involved. > > I'm not sure how you would do that. My notion of recurring vost was > associated with -using- the "votes"... I suppose we could tax on them > whether they chose to use them or not, maybe that's an even better idea. It's just the economic notion of "present value". > > My notion is similar to else's "point pool" of some time back. Where > funds are used to support or reject proposals. > > A possible bot command: #vote 4018 100y > > That would place A$100 on the yes side. Whichever side has the > appropriate number of A$ (55% yes, etc.) gets the nod. > The Characteristic would serve as a limit on the number of votes/A$ you > can cast. (I think I like the symmetry of requiring large number of A$ to > increment your ability to use A$ for voting.) Sounds reasonable. Start with limits of A$20 per person per prop, with increments of A$10 available (but for a smaller price, I think, than I originally suggested - say only A$2000 and you get A$1500 back if you reduce your maximum). > > > I think one important argument regarding recurring voting costs is the > > amount of extra harfwork they'll result in. All votes will not only have > > to be checked against the Registrar's list to determine voting > > eligibility, but also against the Financier's list to determine liquidity. > > Then again, the system above would also require a second check (against > > the Dungeon Master's stats). However, the Financial details change very > > often, at least compared with characteristics, so I think that a regular > > voting cost might be too much work. > > This is true. I don't know if it would be possible for /dev/joe to build > in an interface to allow the financier to keep those records up to date. > Automation can sometimes lead to anamolies, I am aware. > > I'd hate to require the Financier to review all the votes for fraud before > they were released. Perhaps the answer is to make it a Crime of Fraud to > spend A$ which you don't have. I'm tired of things merely being > "impossible" under the rules, it seems to make players more reliant on the > hard work of the harfers. Do your own research, make sure what you > propose is possible, otherwise face the CFCJ. I think crimes like this should be fast-tracked if possible. Rather than bog down the Justice system with lots of CFCJs, and force players to pay A$25 to get someone else done for spending too much money, I'd like to see obvious crimes such as this punishable with immediate Gaol terms and penalties (I dunno, maybe 1 day in Gaol and you go Non-Voting as well?) > Maybe we should get a Prosecuter (Soliciter?). He would accept complaints > from the harfers about players doing illegal things and get them CFCJd. > The reason I suggest a Prosecutor, is I would like them to have some > latitude to accept "plea bargains" on behalf of Ackanomic.. speeding > Justice. Perhaps such a player should be called the Kenstar. The lax system we have doesn't provide much incentive for plea bargains, as harsh CFCJ penalties are rarely meted out. If the rules specified some fixed minimum penalties for certain CFCJs, but Plea Bargains were entrenched as an alternative, then it might be effective. > > Not that I'm against it on principle, though. Provided there's some kind > > of reasonable balance so we don't drive ourselves broke. > > Right, well, under a voting/pooling mechanism, the proceeds (or spoils) > could be split amongst the winners. This would create a "flow voting" > phenomenon. > > Also, a BAA! vote could be free, and entitle you to a split on the > "take"... This would create a way for players to "earn" A$, merely by > voting. > > Would it encourage BAA! voting? Probably. Is that a bad thing? Not > necessarily. It might be more complex, but so that we don't get a majority of BAA votes it might be worth only giving BAA voters half-shares of the take. -- Duncan C. "Slakko" Richer - http://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/~dcr24/ Queens' College Cambridge, 2nd Year Ph.D. (Pure Maths) - Graph Theory Ackanomic - Web-Harfer, ChessUmpire, Map-Harfer, Clerk of the Court ------------------------------ From: Jonathan David Amery Subject: Re: Acka: More Reform Suggestions Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 11:06:09 -0500 (EST) On Wed, 20 Jan 1999, Duncan C. "Slakko" Richer wrote: > It might be more complex, but so that we don't get a majority of BAA votes > it might be worth only giving BAA voters half-shares of the take. > Say that i a majority of votes are BAA! then the prop is boring and no take is taken... -- Jonathan D. Amery, http://www.trinhall.cam.ac.uk/~jda23/home.html ##### Wild Card of Acka, member of SPAM, wearing Silly Agenda Hats. o__####### Holding the Silver Key to the Vault. \'####### Standing between the light and the dark, the candle and the flame. ------------------------------ From: Matt Miller Subject: Re: Acka: More Reform Suggestions Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 11:23:20 -0500 (EST) On Wed, 20 Jan 1999, Duncan C. "Slakko" Richer wrote: > On Wed, 20 Jan 1999, Matt Miller wrote: > > No enforced seniority. Cash-based seniority sounds interesting (or at > least past cash). > Another wacky idea: Each player has a Class, equal to the size of their > Home (i.e. small < cosy < ... < extravagant). You can pay to raise the > Class of proposals (which are small by default). Only players with the > appropriate (or higher) Class can vote on that proposal. > Hehe, you're right, that's wacky. :-) > > I'm not sure how you would do that. My notion of recurring vost was > > associated with -using- the "votes"... I suppose we could tax on them > > whether they chose to use them or not, maybe that's an even better idea. > > It's just the economic notion of "present value". Right.. I understood what you meant after I thought about it. It was just not my original thought. It is new, therefore I fear it. > > The Characteristic would serve as a limit on the number of votes/A$ you > > can cast. (I think I like the symmetry of requiring large number of A$ to > > increment your ability to use A$ for voting.) > > Sounds reasonable. Start with limits of A$20 per person per prop, with > increments of A$10 available (but for a smaller price, I think, than I > originally suggested - say only A$2000 and you get A$1500 back if you > reduce your maximum). > Right, we'd need to think about the appropriate numbers, but yours sound reasonable on their face. > > I'd hate to require the Financier to review all the votes for fraud before > > they were released. Perhaps the answer is to make it a Crime of Fraud to > > spend A$ which you don't have. I'm tired of things merely being > > "impossible" under the rules, it seems to make players more reliant on the > > hard work of the harfers. Do your own research, make sure what you > > propose is possible, otherwise face the CFCJ. > > I think crimes like this should be fast-tracked if possible. Rather than > bog down the Justice system with lots of CFCJs, and force players to pay > A$25 to get someone else done for spending too much money, I'd like to see > obvious crimes such as this punishable with immediate Gaol terms and > penalties (I dunno, maybe 1 day in Gaol and you go Non-Voting as well?) I agree, in principle (see below), but I hate removing at least the appearance of due process. :-) > > Maybe we should get a Prosecuter (Soliciter?). He would accept complaints > > from the harfers about players doing illegal things and get them CFCJd. > > The reason I suggest a Prosecutor, is I would like them to have some > > latitude to accept "plea bargains" on behalf of Ackanomic.. speeding > > Justice. > > Perhaps such a player should be called the Kenstar. The lax system we > have doesn't provide much incentive for plea bargains, as harsh CFCJ > penalties are rarely meted out. If the rules specified some fixed minimum > penalties for certain CFCJs, but Plea Bargains were entrenched as an > alternative, then it might be effective. Sentencing guidlelines.. wow, I'm getting shivers! Perhaps we could allow the Kenstar to act as Judge, Jury and Executioner. He gets a referral from a harfer, determines that the rules have been violated, and imposes the rules-mandated penalty. His rulings would be appealable directly to a Cortex, with -stiff- penalties to the appealer or the Kenstar upon resolution. We'd also need to place strict boundaries on the purview of such an official. I don't want to "short-circuit" the -entire- judicial process. > > Also, a BAA! vote could be free, and entitle you to a split on the > > "take"... This would create a way for players to "earn" A$, merely by > > voting. > > > > Would it encourage BAA! voting? Probably. Is that a bad thing? Not > > necessarily. > > It might be more complex, but so that we don't get a majority of BAA votes > it might be worth only giving BAA voters half-shares of the take. Is a majority of BAA! voters a bad thing? If people -truly- care about a proposal, they will part with their A$ to throw their support one way or the other. I also suggest that when doing the split, we divide the A$ (in integer amounts) equally among all "winning" voters and BAA voters. Any "remainder" would be forfeit to the Treasury. Perhaps this will encourage more interesting proposals. Probably not. For the sake of not having people yell at me, I won't propose that we charge a fee for proposal submission that would be added to the pool. else...if, this is the part where you jump in and say, 'Wait a second I proposed this MONTHS ago!' IB ------------------------------ From: Matt Miller Subject: Re: Acka: More Reform Suggestions Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 11:24:13 -0500 (EST) On Wed, 20 Jan 1999, Jonathan David Amery wrote: > On Wed, 20 Jan 1999, Duncan C. "Slakko" Richer wrote: > > > It might be more complex, but so that we don't get a majority of BAA votes > > it might be worth only giving BAA voters half-shares of the take. > > > > Say that i a majority of votes are BAA! then the prop is boring and no > take is taken... > Another reasonable proposition. IB ------------------------------ From: JT Subject: Re: Acka: More Reform Suggestions Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 12:46:04 -0500 (EST) On Wed, 20 Jan 1999, Duncan C. "Slakko" Richer wrote: >What do people think about the following Vote Economy: > >Everyone has a Vote Characteristic. Default value is 2. Why not start it at 1? >Players may raise their Vote Characteristic by 1 at a cost of A$3000. >They may lower their Vote Characteristic by 1 to receive A$2500. This strongly favors the players who've been playing longer since they are the ones who'll be able to up their vote characteristic. After a while (ie when a number of players have 4 or 5 which will eventually happen) then new players will wonder why they should even bother as their vote won't make a signifigant difference. While I'm not against a voting economy since I agree that the only thing upon which 'scarcity' can be implemented really is the ability to propose and the ability to vote, I do worry that an economy will divide the game into the haves and the have-nots, and if you become a have-not in nomic, there is no real way to change that since by being a have-not in a voting economy, you no longer have the power to change the status quo. --JT [-------------------------------------------------------------------------] [ Practice random kindness and senseless acts of beauty. ] [ It's hard to seize the day when you must first grapple with the morning ] [-------------------------------------------------------------------------] ------------------------------ From: Duncan Richer Subject: Re: Acka: More Reform Suggestions Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 14:00:55 -0500 (EST) On Wed, 20 Jan 1999, JT wrote: > On Wed, 20 Jan 1999, Duncan C. "Slakko" Richer wrote: > >What do people think about the following Vote Economy: > > > >Everyone has a Vote Characteristic. Default value is 2. > > Why not start it at 1? To reduce the amount by which rich existing players can swamp newbies and or poor existing players. > > >Players may raise their Vote Characteristic by 1 at a cost of A$3000. > >They may lower their Vote Characteristic by 1 to receive A$2500. > > This strongly favors the players who've been playing longer since they are > the ones who'll be able to up their vote characteristic. After a while > (ie when a number of players have 4 or 5 which will eventually happen) > then new players will wonder why they should even bother as their vote > won't make a signifigant difference. How many people can get hold of A$3000 easily? Looking at the Financier's log, I see that no player has Cash and Trinkets to the value of A$3000. I think it would take quite a while for a number of players to reach 4 or 5. In the meantime, they won't be able to spend money in other ways, so they could be hamstrung by careful planning on the part of other players with different goals in mind. Also note that the big 4 or 5 voters won't necessarily all be on the same side - I doubt that 2 votes will ever get to be so small an amount that people can afford to ignore it. > While I'm not against a voting economy since I agree that the only thing > upon which 'scarcity' can be implemented really is the ability to propose > and the ability to vote, I do worry that an economy will divide the game > into the haves and the have-nots, and if you become a have-not in nomic, > there is no real way to change that since by being a have-not in a voting > economy, you no longer have the power to change the status quo. Acka hardly ever splits cleanly down power / powerless lines. There'll always be enough horse trading that 2 votes out of 40 can be enough to swing it. -- Duncan C. Richer aka Slakko the Lost Warner Brother | Queens' College http://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/~dcr24/ Ackanomic | U. of Cambridge Web-Harfer, Clerk of the Court, Map-Harfer, Justice | 2nd Year PhD(PMa) ------------------------------ From: Towsner Subject: Re: Acka: More Reform Suggestions Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 17:09:49 -0500 (EST) >Comments? Suggestions? -- -Henry Towsner Thank heavens, the sun has gone in, and I don't have to go out and enjoy it. -Logan Pearsall Smith ------------------------------ From: Towsner Subject: Re: Acka: More Reform Suggestions Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 17:10:14 -0500 (EST) >else...if, this is the part where you jump in and say, 'Wait a second I >proposed this MONTHS ago!' I'm too nice to mention that. Or that I still have, in case you finally realize I was right:) -- -Henry Towsner Thank heavens, the sun has gone in, and I don't have to go out and enjoy it. -Logan Pearsall Smith ------------------------------ End of acka-research Digest V4 #15 **********************************