Call For Judgement 431 - Tue, 15 Jul 1997 23:48:59 -0600 (MDT)
Subject: Names
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: Niccolo Flychuck (selected Jul 15, 1997, 20:11h EDT)
Judgement: retracted by author


Ben became an active player on July 2nd, 1997.
Initiator's Comments:
Here is the relevant paragraph of Rule 252:
A person wishing to join the game, and who cannot do so as a Returning player, should notify the Registrar, providing a valid email address, their real name, and the legal Ackanomic name they wish to play under. Upon them providing this information, should the requested name indeed be a legal Ackanomic name, the Registrar shall post a public message announcing the new player and providing their Ackanomic name, real name, and email address, and if the prospective player provided it, how they discovered the game. Upon the posting of such an announcement, the person becomes registered as a player.
Mr. Lunatic Fringe, the Registrar, did indeed post a public message providing Ben's real name, email address, and an Ackanomic name. The first sentence of the paragraph says that a person wishing to join the game _should_ provide a name they wish to play under. The question is whether or not game custom allows the Registrar to choose a provisional name for a player who does not provide an Ackanomic name.

Or is it the phrasing of the conditional clause in the second sentence? Would "should the requested name indeed be a legal Ackanomic name" be invalid if "the requested name" does not exist, thus negating the rest of that sentence, and making the announcement invalid?

The fact that, upon receiving an email from "Benjamin Good" to join the game, Mr. Lunatic Fringe attempted to create a player named "Ben", perhaps he perceived an implied name request, which has been validated by the fact that "Ben" did indeed choose that name for emself. The assumption that "Ben" was not chosen comes from Mr. LF's phrasing, "Ackanomic name Ben until he changes it". The fact is, aren't all of our names "until we change them"?

Judge's Comments:

Call For Judgement 432 - Sun, 20 Jul 1997 19:37:28 -0400
Subject: The Trouble with Lushrike
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: Karma (selected Jul 15, 1997, 20:14h EDT)
Judgement: INVALID


Alfvaen must add to the Blueprint-Under-Construction for Lushrike any parts submitted to Vynd while Vynd was Acting Mad Scientist.
Initiator's Comments:
Heck, I have no idea. If I knew, I probably wouldn't be submitting this. For instance, Rule 597 says "The Mad Scientist must attach all parts to the Blueprint-Under-Construction". Can Vynd do that if I've got the only copy of the BUC(which I'm fairly sure I can't show to him, because it's illegal)?
Judge's Comments:
This was a consequence where the transfer of a title "Mad Scientist" took place between the uncompleted task of creating a frankenstein monster after studying the rule 597 I cannot find anything that would allow for the transfer, nor can I see anything that would let the former "Mad scientist" who seized being "Mad Scientist" view the BUC for as stated no one may see it except the "Mad Scientist"

Call For Judgement 433 -
Subject: More rule 597 stuff
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: Rex Mundi (selected Jul 15, 1997, 20:17h EDT)


The legality of the Mad Scientist's posting sentences which are valid Frankenstein Parts cannot be determined until the Frankenstein Monster Blueprint is complete.
Initiator's Comments:
To determine whether such an action is legal or illegal, it would be necessary for the Judge to determine whether or not the sentence was, in fact, a part of the BUC. But it is illegal for the Mad Scientist to share that information, so the Judge cannot determine whether or not such an action is illegal.
Judge's Comments:

Call For Judgement 434 - Thu, 24 Jul 1997 23:39:35 -0400
Subject: Private E-mail
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: Vynd (selected Jul 15, 1997, 20:21h EDT)
Judgement: TRUE at Sun, 20 Jul 1997 10:42:56 -0400
Appealed by: Malenkai
Appeal Judgement: FALSE


If a CFCJ is made against the Mad Scientist alleging that e distributed a Frankenstein Part through private email or by some other non-public means, a Judge cannot necessary rule on it with finality.
Initiator's Comments:
What this rests on is the privacy of the medium. I feel that it is impossible to legislate all possible non-public means of sharing information. Furthermore, for most such methods there is little or no evidence that the sharing took place. A private email message can always be forwarded to the Judge, of course, but there is no assurance of authenticity without a PGP signature, since such a document could theoretically be forged.

In the specific case of Frankenstein Parts, it may seem evident that once the final Blueprint can be consulted, it should be evident whether or not the Part could have been knowable by the player without them having received a private email from the Mad Scientist; but the possibility of a lucky guess cannot be ruled out.

This verdict should also apply to judgements on other knowledge which is forbidden to be distributed, such as the Truth of the Machine. (And possibly Church Policy, but that's probably another kettle of fish entirely.)

Judge's Comments:
I judge this to be TRUE. Alfvaen's reasoning is quite sound, I think.
Appealer's Comments:
As much as I'd like to see the verdict upheld, I do not think game custom supports the verdict delivered. I think that game custom is wrong, but its here, and if it has changed, upholding this appeal will strengthen that change.

CFJ 228 established that a Judge can use [what I call] "whim" in reaching a decision. I'm not saying that's the right word, and there may be a better word, but in my mind CFJ 228 affirmed game custom that a Judge can choose any of our 4 verdicts of TRUE, FALSE, UNDECIDED, and INVALID, as needed.

In the case of the specific statement brought by the initiator, and based on the fact that CFJ 228 establised that there are is not a rigorous, mechanical, non-human-decision involved judgement process, the Judge can *always* say UNDECIDED or INVALID. They can also say one of the normal verdicts if they cannot *prove* or *disprove* the assertion because the private e-mail evidence necessary is unavailable. The acka justice system is based on the burden of proof of the judge, and if, for whatever reason, a judge cannot prove an asserion TRUE or FALSE, they will have no problem delivering one of the other verdicts.

Its easy for the Court to uphold the appeal based on the word "necessary" (which I believe should be "necessarily") in the statement; ie, the Judge may be in Gaol, drunk, or there may be a rule that says all Judges may not rule with finality (ie, a bug in the rules, or a weird change to the rules because of a Frobnotzer, etc). I would be disappointed if such were the reasoning of any upholding of the appeal, and ask the Court to examine the *intent* of the statement -- "Because of indeterminacy of information or the Judgement process, a Judge sometimes cannot deliver a verdict". This statement is FALSE as Acka is currently played, unless this CFJ is changing that custom.

Supreme Court's Comments:
The Court agrees that a Judge can always rule on a CFJ, and notes that a verdict of UNDECIDED is an entirely appropriate verdict when necessary information is impossible to obtain within the Rules. On this specific issue the Court feels that nothing further needs to be added. However, some of the statements made in the appeal deserve further comment.

Malenkai's assessment of CFJ 228 is that this CFJ defined a game custom that CFJ verdicts can be decided "at the judge's whim". Now, note that this was not the statement under judgement. Although it appears as an important part of the first judge's reasoning, and the subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court of the time did not address it in their final reasoning. The fact that it chose to uphold the original verdict does not necessarily mean it agrees with everything said by the original judge. Rather, it appears that the Court focused on the assertion: "It is impossible to find a non-paradoxical interpretation of CFJ 227, and the Rules and issues it entails, that would permit a verdict of TRUE", and disagreement with this assertion was sufficient grounds for upholding the verdict of FALSE on CFJ 228. Granted, the Court's silence would seem to imply tacit approval of the issue of judgement by whim. Thus, this Court would like to take advantage of this opportunity to address the issue further.

Returning judgements is one of the most important duties that Ackanomic demands of its players. It is expected that a Judge will make every reasonable effort to understand the Ruleset and identify all the relevant issues in order to determine the proper Judgement. And Rule 215 plainly states that expectation:

All Judgements must be in accordance with all the rules in effect at the time judgement was invoked, and with respect to the game state at that time.

In fact, one might even say that Rule 215 makes it impermissible to do otherwise. Of course, the tricky part is determining what is and is not "in accordance". Rules are written in English, not propositional calculus, and judgements can not be proven to be correct in the way that logical theorems can. Understanding the rules is a human activity, not a mechanical one. It is impossible to require that all CFJ verdicts returned must be "the right one." If there were a decision procedure for testing a verdict for correctness, we would not have a need for them in the first place.

Therefore, it becomes clear that, despite Rule 215, returning a Judgement that is "wrong" is not impermissible, simply because it is impossible to always know that a "wrong" verdict can be identified. (Or, taking a non-Platonic viewpoint, that a "right" verdict even exists at all.) From this plain observation, the Court must admit that a judgement can be returned "at whim" and not be in violation of the rules, and to this extent the Court can only agree with the statements of CFJ 228.

However, the whole truth of the matter is that the expectation of judges to return honest, logically satisfying verdicts simply cannot be codified. In the final assessment, it stands outside of the rules, and exists entirely in what we call the spirit of the game. Rule 215 does not capture that spirit so much as stand for it, and indicate its existence. (This expectation is furthermore embodied by the Supreme Court itself, which is charged with the task of legislating this need for well-reasoned verdicts on a case-by-case basis - a job that it takes with the utmost seriousness even as it recognizes that infallibility is frequently not possible.) This spirit is what the texts of CFJ 228 do not address.

In the previous paragraph the Court states that the expectation of honest verdicts is wholly within the spirit of the game. This is actually untrue, for it is also very much a game custom. If you look at the history of CFJs in Ackanomic, one commonality that stands out is the thoughtfulness and care that have been brought to them by their various judges - judges that include so many different players. There is no custom of returning judgements at whim in Ackanomic; if anything, the truth is quite the opposite.

Penalty to original judge:
1 point.

Call For Judgement 435 - Sun, 20 Jul 1997 19:22:44 -0400
Subject: Otzma my income
Initiator: /dev/joe
Judge: Karma (selected Jul 15, 1997, 20:24h EDT)
Judgement: FALSE


Vynd's use of an Otzma Card Share your income on /dev/joe for A$400 on July 14 was not in accordance with the rules.
Initiator's Comments:
This depends on the definition of "receives".

R1250.7 says:

An Otzma Card of this type can only be played in the public forum. When a player plays this a Card of this type e also names another player, and a sum of money which is at most half of a sum the named player received in the preceding three days.
The only change in the A$ /dev/joe owned in the three days preceding the otzma card usage was the conversion of a trinket to A$. Remember that trinket creation and destruction is the only normal event which actually changes A$ into other entities (or vice versa) instead of paying the A$ into or taking them from the treasury. R506 says:
The owner of a Trinket may transform it into its value in A$ by publically announcing they are doing so. This action destroys the Trinket, creating A$ in its stead, and it upsets the art and antiquities communities.
If anybody has any Go Fish Otzma Cards for sale, I am interested in buying them, regardless of the outcome of this CFJ.
Judge's Comments:
Vynd's use of the otzma card was legal because it was played according to the rules (rule 1250.7 below) , in a public forum. however It is true the only income dev/joe received in the past three days was the conversion of the trinket so the only A($) vynd would be entitled to would be no more than half of the value of the trinket.

Call For Judgement 436 - Sun, 20 Jul 1997 10:44:54 -0400
Subject: Pulse Entities
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: Dread Pirate Roberts (declined)
2nd Judge: Vynd (selected Jul 17, 1997, 22:13h EDT)
Judgement: TRUE


The Entity called the Pulse Shovel, owned by two-star, is not a Trinket.
Initiator's Comments:
This Entity was created by self-deleting text in Proposal 2196 by two-star, which was "two-star is ambushed by Thargoids, loses one point, and all his gaol house rock shovels are converted into pulse shovels". This was an obvious emulation of the original text of "More Blatant Elitism".

So what happened with "More Blatant Elitism"? "Military lasers", a Trinket, was transformed into a "Pulse Laser", a gadget. So obviously game custom dictates that changing a Trinket(or class of Trinkets)with a particular name into some Entity with another name does not necessarily create a Trinket with that name.

Furthermore, how would this Trinket be created? It would have be by a Rule, since two-star did not personally create a Trinket called "Pulse Shovel". Rule 506 states "Other rules may also create and bestow ownership of Trinkets, so long as the rule provides for naming, describing, and valuing the Trinket." I do not believe that the self-deleting text in Proposal 2196 satisfies those conditions, even if we are to assume that a Trinket is being created by it(which is nowhere stated), since it does not provide for describing or valuing the Trinket. (Unless it is assumed that the value and description of "Gaol House Rock Shovel" is to be carried over, which I do not believe there is sufficient precedent for.)

Thus all that two-star has in his position is a miscellaneous, nontradeable entity named "Pulse Shovel". It is not a Trinket, or a Gadget, or even a Majik. It has no function, and if it were given one(except possibly by creation of a Blueprint)he would be guilty of Patent Infringement. Good luck getting rid of it.

Judge's Comments:
In game custom, it seems to me that when the rules call for something to be created and do not specify exactly what it is, then it is assumed to be an entity, and nothing more specific than that. Did Proposal 2196 in fact create the pulse shovel by converting the gaol house shovel? I believe that it did. Conversion, as it is generaly used, indicates a major change, or a replacement of one thing with another. It is not usually used to mean rename. The actual Rules ahve little to say on this matter. Rules 506 and 511 do, however, provide examples of trinkets being transformed into non-trinkets, which shows that such a thing is at least legal. Thus I rule this CFJ TRUE.

Call For Judgement 437 - Sun, 27 Jul 1997 09:52:48 -0400
Subject: Similarity II
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: Mr Lunatic Fringe (selected Jul 19, 1997, 00:33h EDT) (declined)
2nd Judge: Karma (selected Jul 20, 1997, 19:44h EDT) (declined)
3rd Judge: Rex Mundi (selected Jul 21, 1997, 19:04h EDT)
Judgement: TRUE
Appealed by Mr. Lunatic Fringe and Niccolo Flychuck
Appeal: FALSE

It cannot be determined with finality whether the Church of Seleya is eligible for a Seat in the Synod.
Initiator's Comments:
This is not a PWCFJ, although it could easily be reworded to be. Its the situations, and not the wins, that I find intersting, and by making winning *not* an outcome, the air can be cleared. This is just for fun.

Rule 1303, section 10b, says:

> b. A Church is not eligible for a Seat in the Synod if the total M
> Similarities with all the Churches which are members of the Synod is
> equal to or greater than 80.
CFJ 429 established that self-similarity was undefined. This rule establishes eligibility based on, in part, a test that involved calculation of self-similarity. Thus the eligibilty cannot be determined with finality. What than means, I'll leave to someone else to decide.

Note that none of the other churches, indeed any church, is eligible either.

Judge's Comments:
I concur with Malenkai's reasoning.
Mr. Lunatic Fringe's Appeal Reasoning:
Whilke I have nothing against Malenkai's or Rex Mundi's reasoning, and am unable to find a compelling arguement in opposition myself, I am unsatisfied with the results of theis CFJ because it just *seems* wrong. I am taking this oppritunity to appeal it to the Supreme Court where our wise justices can mull over the matter a little more.
Niccolo Flychuck's Appeal Reasoning:
As I've stataed before, CFJ 429 established no such thing. The reasoning for that CFJ may have mentioned this, but the CFJ statement was very specific, and refered to no Organization other than TMBSG.

I find this a real stretch of one's logical imagination to apply this reasoning to any Organization. Especially from a player who is so strict about other things, such as, when is there truly a precedecne conflict. Arguing that is no more that trying to pull the wool over our collective eyes :)

As far as the eligibility clause quoted by Malenkai, there are a couple of different eligibility clauses in the Synod rules, each for a different purpose, and that is why this specific definition of eligiligy cannot be reasonably applied to anything other than the clause in which it is present. That clause is specifically about eligiblity to join the Synod. It is unnquestionable that the Church of Seleya is not eligible to join the Synod, because it already has a Seat (that's another condition)

Supreme Court's Reasoning:
Let us first get two issues out of the way.

One: Given the precedent of CFJ 429 (namely, the phrase "[f]or any two Organizations X and Y" that appears in section 4 of Rule 1003 "Organizations" does not permit X and Y to be the same Organization), it is clear that the "orgsim" relation between any given Organization and itself is undefined by this rule. Since no other rules provides a definition for this particular case, such a relation is undefined by the Rules as a whole. As a direct consequence, the H, L, and M Similarities of any Organization with itself are all also undefined.

Two: One of the appealers raised the issue that the Church of Seleya is automatically not eligible for a Seat in the Synod simply by virtue of the fact that it already has such a Seat. In other words, that section 10b of Rule 1303 "Synod" uses "eligibility" only in the sense of being able to obtain a Seat, and is not a qualification that is necessary to uphold after the Seat has already been secured. However, section 10c immediately following describes a process by which an Organization "becomes ineligible" and thereby "loses its Seat in the Synod". There is no indication anywhere that the two uses of the concept of eligibility were meant to be interpreted differently, and so the Court does not consider this argument to be compelling.

And so, the issue at hand is the fact that the M Similarity for a particular Church pairing is not defined by the rules. The question is, then, how this affects the Church of Seleya's eligibility to maintain a Seat in the Synod. The Court has considered two possible interpretations.

The first interpretation sees section 10b as instructing us to find the total for a set of numbers, one of which is undefined. Note that it is not indeterminate: that would imply that the sum exists but the Rules do not give enough information to calculate it. This value is instead flatly nonexistent. Since addition with undefined values is an operation that is also not defined, the final sum must in turn be undefined as well.

Under this interpretation, the Church of Seleya would actually not be ineligible by section 10b. That section only requires this sum to NOT be greater than or equal to 80. An undefined value clearly cannot be greater than, equal to, or less than 80, so the Church of Seleya cannot be denied eligibility on these terms.

The second interpretation, on the other hand, sees section 10b as instructing us to find the total M Similarities with all Churches in the Synod. The subtle difference here is that because this one value is not defined - is, in fact, nonexistent - it is excluded from being part of the calculation in the first place. That is, since there is no such thing as a Church's M Similarity with itself, it cannot be included in the phrase "the total M Similarities".

Under this second interpretation, the Church of Seleya once again would not be denied eligibility by section 10b.

Therefore, since both interpretations lead to the same conclusion, the Court rules that the original verdict is overturned.

(After some consideration, the Court has chosen not to comment on which of the two interpretations should be preferred. Such a reasoning would only be applicable as precedent to a narrow range of future situations. This sort of ambiguity is best dealt with on a case-by-case basis, rather than attempting to synthesize some sort of Universal Solvent. And while the two interpretations lead to different outcomes with respect to other Churches, Rule 1303 has already been altered to remove the ambiguous wording under judgement. The Court has therefore decided to let this side issue wait for its own CFJ.)

Penalty to original judge:
1 point.

Call For Judgement 438 - Thu, 24 Jul 1997 19:29:35 -0400
Subject: Treasure
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: mr cwm (selected Jul 20, 1997, 10:38h EDT)
Judgement: TRUE


If a Map Writer or Map Custodian believes the conditions of a Treasure Map to be fulfilled, and declares the Map to be destroyed and the Treasure to be found, and later on discovers that the conditions were not in fact fulfilled, then the Treasure should be considered to not have been found, nor the Treasure Map destroyed.
Initiator's Comments:
I'm not sure whether this is covered by Rule 1217 or not. It does not state any truly rigorous game requirements that a Map's conditions be satisfied validly; I don't believe that it is necessarily a Crime, for instance, to mistakenly destroy a Treasure Map. Since the language of Treasure Maps is often not "legalese", it is left up to the Map Writer or Custodian to determine whether the conditions have been met. Can e change eir mind?
Judge's Comments:
From R1217: Upon a player ... achieving the conditions for finding buriedTreas ure as specified by a Treasure Map, it is a duty of the map writer or a map custodian (if any exist) to make this fact, and the map, public (once they become aware of the conditions being achieved, and the final act that lead to the condition being achieved is publically knowable). This action destroys the map, and the player who achieved the condition receives the Treasure ...

OK, so what destroys the map? "This action." What action? "Mak(ing) this fact, and the map, public." What fact? That of "a player ... achieving the condition."

So if "a player ... achieving the condition" is not a fact (a determination that can, ultimately, be made only by CFJ), what has been made public is a lie and the map, which is not the action required to cause the map to be destroyed and its treasure distributed. Thus, the map was not destroyed, nor the Treasure found, whatever we may have been lead to believe.

Call For Judgement 439 - Tue, 29 Jul 1997 18:37:59 -0400
Subject: Ambassador
Initiator: Voting Gnome
Judge: Karma (selected Jul 20, 1997, 22:07h EDT)
Judgement: FALSE at Thu, 24 Jul 1997 23:37:09 -0400
Appealed by Voting Gnome
Appeal verdict: FALSE

The position of Ambasador is not an Ackanomic Office.
Initiator's Comments:
Rule 419.1 crreates the position of Ambasador, but does not declare it to be a political or functional office. Neither does it specify any elective procedure for filling the position. Additionally, while Rule 419.1 (along with 419.2) outline "duties" of the Ambasador, nothing is mentioned of "privileges", which Rule 401 specifically states is a commonality with all Offices. Thereby, any Player volunteering may become the Ambasador.
Judge's Comments:
quoting from rule 401. (something ) is this excerpt
(x) Office Type All offices are either Functional or Political. If the rules fail to specify the type of an office, that office is a Political Office. Vacancies in a particular Political office are filled by election for office (by the procedure in R 402), unless other rules specify otherwise. In the case of an optional Political office where a nomination did not produce any volunteers, the election process is aborted at that point.

This clearly states that any position Pertaining to "a seat" is either functional or political

Appealer's Comments:
While I admit that Karm's reasoning has taken care of the first two arguments of my reasoning, there is still the fact that Rule 401 states that all Offices shall have "duties" and "privileges". Since Rule 419 makes no provision for "privileges", I still maintain that the Ambassador is not really an Ackanomic Office.

I hereby appeal CFJ 439 to the Supreme Court. We need more Voting Gnomes in Internomic!

Supreme Court's Comments:
The Office of the Ambassador has at least one privilege, namely "the ability to cast extra votes in certain circumstance", as per Rule 419.2. Furthermore, the Court can find no reasonable interpretation of Rule 401 that requires the number of privileges of an Office to be non-zero. The original verdict is therefore upheld.

As an aside, the Court would like to point out that if the position of Ambassador were not an Office, then none of the rules defining Offices would apply. And since the rules specific to the Ambassador do not provide a means for filling that position, there would then be no way for any player, voting or otherwise, to become Ambassador.

Call For Judgement 440 - Tue, 29 Jul 1997 18:31:34 -0400
Subject: Gadgets
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: ThinMan (selected Jul 20, 1997, 22:28h EDT) (failed to respond)
2nd Judge: mr cwm (selected Jul 24, 1997, 23:51h EDT)
Judgement: FALSE


Removing Clause (vi) of Rule 595, "Gadgets", will cause many existing Gadgets to stop working since they will no longer be able to manipulate entities.
Initiator's Comments:
I am phrasing it that way because I find it easier than the converse; I believe that it should be ruled FALSE.

The clause in question is(excluding square-bracketed text which does not change the effect):

(vi) A Gadget may create, destroy, or manipulate a Protected entity if its Blueprint so specifies.

I have listed in a recent email message the rules which contain the word "Protected", and they are few. I do not believe that removing this restriction will have the effects that Malenkai claims.

Malenkai stated that he beleieves game custom holds that all entities are "Protected", because of that phrasing in an earlier version of Rule 500. However, Niccolo Flychuck also stated, in reference to a recent proposal to amend Rule 1301, that "Protection language is obsolete". So it seems to me that no entities are Protected, except perhaps those that specifically state it in the Rules, and I can't find any real reason why a Gadget should be able to manipulate those things in the first place.

If what is _meant_ is that Gadgets may manipulate any entity, then perhaps the CSRR Officer should change Rule 595 to reflect this fact if this CFJ is judged true.

Malenkai's Bronze Torch Reasoning:
> Alfvaen's Reasoning [quoted]:

> I have listed in a recent email message the rules which contain the word
> "Protected", and they are few.  I do not believe that removing this
> restriction will have the effects that Malenkai claims.
The provision in clause (vi) is a an *enabling provision*, not a restriction. The key question here is to ask: What does the word "Protection" mean as used in clause (vi). I am going to make a case that it means "any" or "all" (or is a no-op), whereas the initiator appears to make a claim that it is an attribute, without definition, yet with significance (if it has no significance, then it doesn't really exist, leading to any or all anyway). I am going to argue that my construction is supported by game custom, whereas no other is. (Saying "protected entity" means "all entities" is the same as saying "protected" is a no-op).
> Malenkai stated that he beleieves [sic] game custom holds that all
> entities are "Protected",
I did not say such a thing, and prefer to be quoted directly in the future, rather than have my quotes misconstrued. I stated that game custom gives us the construction of "Protected entity" to mean "any entity", because that is what it meant from the time Blanket Protection was added with proposal 986, and continued to mean when its definition was removed with proposals 1416 and 1539.

The question ramins, then, what does "Protection" mean when its defintion is removed. When proposal 986 was accepted, giving all entities and actions Protection by default, the term became obsolete as an adjective, yet was not removed from all places as an adjective. Some entities were described by the adjective, whereas others were not, yet the idea of Protection as described in rule 592 applied to everything, hence the word had no real meaning where it was actually used as an adjective at that point; it was obsolete, a no-op.

That is when this custom was created, and it applied to clause (vi) at that time. It remained defined as a noun in rule 592 for entities and actions (ie, rule 592 delineated what it meant for an entity to be Protected). Entity Protection was removed from rule 592 and moved to rule 500 by proposal 1416. Proposal 1416 was a very long proposal which removed virtually all instances of the word Protection from the rules where it pertained to entites. This did not change the customary meaninglessness of the word. The fact that it did not remove the instance in clause (vi) did not remove the custom created by its obsolecence by proposal 986, and did not change what it *meant* to be Protected, which for entities, was now described by rule 500, without use of the actual word. Proposal 1539 later moved action Protection into rule 101, strengthened the concept of Protection, and dumped rule 592 altogether. Again, this did not change the customary null rendering of the word as used as an adjective. Clause (vi) meant the same thing, whether or not proposal 1416 accidently forgot to remove it. Proposal 1416 did not create this custom because of the oversight, it was *already* there with 986.

> However, Niccolo Flychuck also stated, in reference to a recent
> proposal to amend Rule 1301, that "Protection language is obsolete".
Niccolo may or may not have said that, but the statement is true, IMO. As I have stated, it became obsolete by proposal 986, yet game custom allowed it to exist as a null op in various places, including clause (vi).

The rules are silent on the proper construction of the term "Protected", therefore the above game custom must be consulted to find the correct rendering, and since proposal 986, that rendering is a no-op.

Given that, clause (vi) gives Gadgets the ability to manipulate entities as described in their blueprints. Without clause (vi), Gadgets have no rule-based authority to change the game state, hence they cannot, as rule 101 is clear on the matter of the game state may only be changed as described in the rules (which, ironically, is part of my half of the elimination of Protection and CFJ 113 -- proposal 1539).

> seems to me that no entities are Protected, except perhaps those that
> specifically state it in the Rules, and I can't find any real reason why a
> Gadget should be able to manipulate those things in the first place.
To clarify my difference of opinion with the initiator: He appears to be arguing for Protection to be an attribute of entities, even in the absense of a definition of the term, and I am arguing that Protection is an obsolete term whose rendering, in the places it remains, is given to us by game custom; it is *not* an attribute. I am *not* arguing that all entities are *Protected*, but that "Protected" means "any" as used in clause (vi). Indeed, game custom itself favors my interpretion over that of the initiator, because that is how we have been doing it in the case of clause (vi) since proposal 986, over a year now (gee time flies...). If the initiator's apparent interpretation indeed held sway, then gadgets could *not* manipulate most entities, and the CFJ would indeed should be judged FALSE for that reason, but that is not the game custom interpretation of clause (vi). In any case, I cannot find how gadgets will manipulate *any* entities, under *either* interpretation, if clause (vi) is removed (although if the initiator's apparent non- customary construction is chosen, it doesn't really matter much).
> If what is _meant_ is that Gadgets may manipulate any entity, then perhaps
> the CSRR Officer should change Rule 595 to reflect this fact if this CFJ is
> judged true.
Yes, this is a perfect candidate for a CSRR, but the enabling provision of clause (vi) must remain. I do not see how the CFJ can be judged other than TRUE.
Judge's Comments:
(I haven't felt the need to download the entire rule set and conduct a search for quite a while.)

It is impermissible to turn to game custom in this case. R595/17(vi) is clear, as there are at least two instances of entity protection being defined in the Rules: by R921/5 the Amber Banana Tree (which is an entity by R923/7) may be protected by the Bronze Umbrella, and by R1131/9 Rules (which are entities by R500/1) may be protected by Earth Defense Missles.

R595/17(vi), then, gives Gadgets the ablility to create, destroy, or manipulate both the Amber Banana Tree while it is under the protection of the Bronze Umbrella, and Rules that are under the protection of Earth Defense Missles. One should note, however, that R595/17(i) states that "the Gadget behaves in the manner defined by the Blueprint." Any Gadget, then, whose Bluprint defines its behavior in such a way that it could manipulate the protected entities noted above, has the ability to do so by R595/17(i). R595/17(vi), therefore, adds nothing to the ability of any Gadget, and its removal will not take any ability away.

(... on reflection, I feel I must address Malenkai's claim that without R595/17(vi), Gadgets will have no ability to affect the game state, which I quote here: "Without clause (vi), Gadgets have no rule-based authority to change the game state, hence they cannot, as rule 101 is clear on the matter of the game state may only be changed as described in the rules (which, ironically, is part of my half of the elimination of Protection and CFJ 113 -- proposal 1539)." I contend that R595/17(i) is a rule which descibes how a Gadget may effect a change in the game state, namely, as it behaves in a manner defined in its Blueprint. R101/3 does not require that the actual changes in the game state be described in the Rules--if that were case then no proposal could ever become a rule, unless it already was one. Rather, R101/3 requires that the methods by which the game state may be changed must be described, a requirement that R595/17(i) fulfills.)

Call For Judgement 441 - Sat, 26 Jul 1997 12:00:49 -0400
Subject: brain-stoppingly obvious
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: /dev/joe (selected Jul 25, 1997, 22:00h EDT)
Judgement: TRUE


It is permissible for Church Policy to force a Church member to leave a Church.
Initiator's Comments:
Rule 1301 says that Church Policy cannot prevent a Church member from leaving, but it says nothing about the converse. Rule 1003 is similarly silent on the matter. Therefore, I would assume that it is permissible, since Church Policy is allowed to regulate admission policies, and hence by implication the membership of the Church in general, with the single restriction already mentioned.

This may be brain-stoppingly obvious, but I'd still like it cleared up.

Judge's Comments:
I begin by noting that there is weak precedent for a TRUE verdict by CFJ 140, but the rules in this area have changed so much since then that I feel an examination of the current rules is in order. (That CFJ actually concerned parties; churches didn't exist yet. Sorry that that CFJ's reasoning doesn't describe the situation more; Mohammed tried to join FOOZBALL against their will and they tried to throw him out.)

The content of church policy is only regulated by a few sections of R1301. By section 3d, church policy can only change according to church policy. By section 3f, it cannot take the power to ordain priests away from the founder, nor give that power to anyone else. By section 3g, it cannot prevent a member from leaving a church.

There are a few other places where Church Policy is mentioned, but none of them restrict its content or effect. I do note, though, that except for a couple definitions -- most senior priest, methods for pristhood making decisions, methods for accepting new members, and methods of managing the church's policy and assets -- which are explicitly referenced, the only power given to church policy is section 3c, which makes it a crime (Iconoclasm) for a member of a church to disobey the church's policy, and makes it impermissible for a player to take an action which violates church policy (though Iconoclasm can still occur by inaction).

Thus, though it is permissible for church policy to require a member to leave the church, if that member does not do so, he is guilty of Iconoclasm and still a member of the church. Perhaps "removal from an organization" should be added to the list of possible penalties in Rule 710.

Call For Judgement 442 - Tue, 29 Jul 1997 18:33:58 -0400
Subject: Church
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: Vynd (selected Jul 25, 1997, 22:04h EDT)
Judgement: FALSE


It is possible for the Priest of a Church to have eir Priesthood stripped from em, if that Church's Policy specifies ways for such to occur.
Initiator's Comments:
Again, it says in Rule 1301 that only the Church Founder can ordain Priests, no matter what Church Policy may say to the contrary, but it says nothing about how a Priest can be stripped of eir Priesthood. It seems to me that this should fall under the purview of Church Policy as well.
Judge's Comments:
Nowhere in the rules is a method for stripping Priesthood from someone defined, so far as I can see. Good old Rule 101 tells us that if something isn't regulated or prohibited, then you can do it. I believe, however, that Rule 1301 goes into sufficient depth as to what Priests can do, and how to become a Priest, that Priesthood as a whole is regulated by the rules, even if the specifics of stripping a Priest of said status is not.

Church Policy is given legal strength by clause 3c (Iconclasm) of Rule 1301, which says that it is impermissible for players to take actions that constitue Iconclasm if they have any legal alternative. While this gives Church Policy the ability to make things that would normaly be legal impossible, it does not give Church Policy the power to make things that are impossible possible. The most that Church Policy could do towards stripping someone of their Priesthood would be to require them to take the (impossible) action of stripping themselves or others of the title, and end up just forcing people into Iconclasm. Thus I rule FALSE on this CFJ. Note that this judgement does not pretend to claim that it is entirely impossible to strip someone's Preisthood, as a senate resolution or proposal could easily do so, but rather restricts itself to the Church Policy case that seemed to be the intent of the statement. Further note that, yes, this means that once you are a Priest you're pretty much going to stay that way.

Call For Judgement 443 - Tue, 29 Jul 1997 18:31:34 -0400
Subject: Trivially True
Initiator: Niccolo Flychuck
Judge: /dev/joe (selected Jul 29, 1997, 19:02h EDT)
Judgement: TRUE


Malenkai is a membr of They Might Be Slumbering Giants.
Initiator's Comments:
This is trivially True. However, previously Malenkai argued that a CFJ that established that a statement was true about They Might Be Slumbering Giants is necessarily True about any Organization. Therefore I argue that a judgement of True on this CFJ means that Malenkai is necessarily a member of all Organizations.
Judge's Comments:
Malenkai requested membership in TMBSG on June 13th, and Calvin N Hobbes, the founding member, supported this request on that day. I believe the request was not official until every member of TMBSG supported it, or after 7 days with no objections, but in any case Malenkai has been a member of TMBSG since June 20th.

I disagree with the initiator's reasoning though; in the situation Malenkai was arguing about, the same logic that applies to TMBSG applies to every organization, while in this situation, it is clear that this reasoning does not apply to some organizations, such as RexBank, which Malenkai never requested membership in, nor did the membership of the organization offer it.

Call For Judgement 444 - Wed, 30 Jul 1997 22:55:16 -0400
Subject: Voting in Favor
Initiator: Vynd
Judge: two-star (failed to deliver verdict)
2nd Judge: Malenkai (declined)
3rd Judge: Supreme Court (assigned Aug 13, 1997, 21:46h EDT)
Judgement: TRUE


The Senate did not vote in favor of the Senate resolution provisonaly entitled "Concerning the Senate".
Judge's Comments:

> Pursuant to rule 1001 ("Institutions") I announce the voting results
> of the SR: "Concerning the Senate".  Said SR is ACCEPTED, 1 vote for.
> [From section 3: "Results may be announced before the alloted time
> ends, in which case the voting period is over when those results are
> announced."  Note that the announcer is nowhere required to be a
> member of the institution.]
> Malenkai

I'd quote the other messages he sent, but I'm not up to the cutting and pasting. Essentially, Malenkai exercised his privilige as Speaker to submit a senate resolution, voted on it as proconsul (since the Senate was in a 0-0 tie) and then announced the vote as above.

This is mostly correct, everything except the accepted part. The Pro-Consul can vote whenever there is a tie, not jsut when all Senators ahve voted and there is a tie. It is correct that anyone is allowed to announce the results of the vote, and thereby end the voting period, even if the vote has not been truly completed. However...

Rule 1001 section 2a says:

"...An Institution votes "in favor" of something or "in support of an action" when a simple majority of it's members vote "in favor" or "in support."

Rule 411.1 3rd paragraph says:

"If the Senate votes in favor of accepting a resolution then immediately after the results of the vote are publicly announced..." yadda yadda yadda.

1 of 5 does not constitue a majority. Thus the Senate did not vote in favor of the resolution, and since it's voting period ended without the Senate voting in favor, it didn't pass.

Supreme Court's Comments:
The facts in this case seem clear. When the Senate was tied with respect to the acceptance vote on SR 102, the Speaker, in eir role as Proconsul, cast a vote in favor of its acceptance. Then, e reported the final results of the Senate vote as 1-0, with the four Senators abstaining, and as a result, claimed that SR 102 was accepted.

At the time, the Speaker claimed that eir casting of the vote was legal because the rules allow the Proconsul to cast a vote "when" the vote is tied, rather than when the vote is tied after all Senators have voted or when the vote is tied at the end of the voting period -- whatever wording would cause the Proconsul to vote in the Acka Senate just as the Vice President does in the United States Senate. The Court agrees this was legal.

The Speaker also claimed that eir preemptive reporting was legal because Rule 1001 does not restrict who may report the voting results of an Institution. In this respect also, the Speaker's actions appear to be within the rules.

The initiator of this CFJ, however, raises a valid point -- what exactly is the effect of this? E quotes Rule 1001, section 2a, which states that an Instituion accepts something if a simple majority of its members vote in favor of that something. Clearly, SR 102 was not accepted as a result of this clause. None of the four members of the Senate voted in favor of SR 102.

Rule 1001, however, should be more closely examined. First of all, it states that its sections 2a-c defer to other rules governing decision-making procedures in Ackanomic. The Court has failed to find other portions of other Rules whose provisions for the acceptance of failure of a Senate Resolution are anything other than those described in Rule 1001, sections 2a-c. Specifically, neither Rule 411 (The Senate) or Rule 411.1 (Senate Resolutions) give any indication that the acceptance of a Senate Resolution, or any other vote of the Senate, should be based on criteria other than those found in Rule 1001.

As noted above, SR 102 was not accepted by the Senate with regard to clause 2a of Rule 1001. Neither was it rejected by this clause, since a simple majority of the Senate did not vote against it. 2a gives no guidance in this matter.

Clause 2b governs Institutional decisions with many possible outcomes. Since the only two votes a Senator could have cast on SR 102 were yes or no, it too gives no guidance in this matter.

Clause 2c governs what to do when a vote is tied without means to break it, or if the application of a tiebreaker fails to break the tie. It does not apply either, since there does exist a tiebreaker for the Senate (the Proconsul's vote) and that vote did succeed it breaking the tie (in a most basic sense -- before the Speaker voted, the vote was tied 0-0. Afterwards, it was untied 1-0.)

The Court wonders though, what is the result of the tie being broken? The rules provide no answer. Nowhere do the Rules give any indication that the Proconsul vote causes the acceptance or rejection of a Senate matter -- they simply state that e may cast it. Rule 1001, section 2, is the only portion of the Rules that addresses whether a Senate vote results in acceptance or rejection of a measure, and does not address the situation with which we are faced.

It seems that in the absence of other rules defining acceptance/rejection criteria, Rule 1001 imposes an implicit quorum on Institutional votes -- the only circumstances in which a yes/no decision can be reached are those in which a majority of the members vote in favor or opposition to a measure. This quorum results from the fact that R1001 is not a robust rule -- the Speaker's actions have found one of its holes.

It is the Court's opinion that the Senate did not accept SR102. It is also the Court's opinion that the Senate did not reject SR102. The Senate did, however, fulfill its obligation under the Rules -- it put the matter up for vote, and reported its results.

Due to the lack of accptance of SR102, the Court rules TRUE.

Call For Judgement 445 - Fri, 01 Aug 1997 22:52:27 -0400
Subject: When is a newspaper not a newspaper
Initiator: Voting Gnome
Judge: mr cwm (selected Aug 01, 1997, 22:51h EDT) (declined)
2nd Judge: Rex Mundi (selected Aug 02, 1997, 23:03h EDT)


The publication known as "is not" is not a newspaper.
Initiator's Comments:
Judge's Comments:
I can see no reason for is not not to be a newspaper. It was started and named according to the rules on newspapers, and its name is not the same as is, so it is a newspaper. mr cwm may have committed several crimes by publishing untruths, but that is another matter.